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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the political evolution of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Using the climate change discussions at 
Copenhagen as a starting point, the paper considers the ways in which COP 15 has 
become illustrative of the disillusionment around the UNFCCC process to produce a 
substantive global climate change strategy.  Drawing in part on a selection of 
interview quotes from individuals who were invited to comment on both the current 
and political history of the UNFCCC, the paper suggests that outcomes to both 
Copenhagen – and more recently Cancun – were not entirely unexpected given the 
problematic political process that has characterized the historical evolution of the 
UNFCCC. It is argued that the many weaknesses in the UNFCCC political 
framework can be traced largely to a policy framework that has served to facilitate 
the capacity of the more powerful nations to articulate their own issues of national 
self-interest, economic gain, and political sovereignty. The paper argues that 
decision-making throughout the history of the UNFCCC has invariably been at the 
expense of those have less ‘agency’ in international relations and who are more often 
more vulnerable to the short-term impacts of a changing climate.  Drawing on 
Wallerstein’s idea of a ‘capitalist world system’, it is suggested that the reproduction 
of this unequal core-periphery relationship in the UNFCCC political process 
invariably limits the prospects of an effective climate change strategy at the global 
level. 
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1. Introduction 
Albrecht and Arts (2005:885) suggest that the evolution of the UNFCCC since 1992 
has seen the emergence of an impressive international regime on climate change 
incorporating ‘legally binding quantitative targets on the emission of greenhouse 
gases for thirty-eight countries as well as for the European Union’. In addition, as 
they point out, the development of the UNFCCC has also seen the evolution of a set 
of guidelines for countries to develop their own indigenous climate change policies; 
an important aspect of which is the framework set out for developing countries, 
allowing them a period of time to innovate within their own development needs – 
aided by cooperation over technology transfer from developed nations.    
 
However, the disappointment around Copenhagen, and more recently Cancun, to 
deliver a meaningful global climate change deal – despite the positive spin which 
many developed country representatives have attempted to put on these discussion – 
has served to put the spotlight on the UNFCCC both an institutional framework that 
serve as a political forum through which to encourage deeper collaboration on a 
sustainable, low carbon future at the transnational level but, more importantly, will 
deliver meaningful cuts in global carbon emissions. Critics of the outcome of the 
Copenhagen climate change negotiations pointed out that: 
 
o The Copenhagen Accord which was ‘agreed’ at the end of the Summit 
negotiations is not a legally binding agreement; 
o Only five countries had influence in shaping the Accord; 
o COP delegates only ‘took note’ of the Accord rather than adopting it; 
o A legally binding successor or complement to the Kyoto Protocol stayed at the 
margins during the Copenhagen Summit discussions and remains undecided; 
o There are no real targets on emissions reductions set in the Copenhagen Accord; 
o The promised mobilization of 100 billion dollars per year to developing countries 
will not be fully in place until 2020; 
o There is currently no guarantee or information on where the climate funds will 
come from; 
o There is no agreement on how much individual countries would contribute to or 
benefit from the proposed funding streams which were drafted into the Accord; 
o The head of the G77 has noted that it will only secure the economic security of a 
few nations; 
o There is not an international approach to technology on offer in the Accord. 
 
The failure of the Cancun discussions to follow up on the relative failure of 
Copenhagen, revisits concerns expressed by commentators such as McLintock (2007) 
regarding the very notion that the political structure of the United Nations (UN) can 
ever realistically serve as a political conduit through which to tackle climate change 
in an effective manner. Perhaps more than any other of the climate change 
discussions, the intense media spotlight on COP 15 served to amplify ongoing 
problems in the UNFCCC process, related particularly to a lack of sovereign powers, 
lack of conventional political legitimacy, and its chronic financing problems.  More 
importantly, COP 15 was perhaps significant in that it demonstrated an absence of 
  
6
what Andanova et al (2009:53) describe as ‘the authoritative steering of network 
constituents to achieve public goals – a political framework which is of growing 
significance in world politics and in climate cooperation in particular’.   
 
Bulkeley and Moser (2007:1) pointed out in 2007 that ‘it has become an accepted 
wisdom within academic circles and within academic circles and policy discourse 
that climate change is a global problem in need of global solutions’.  This paper 
examines this statement more closely in the light of the failure of Copenhagen to 
produce a visibly effective global political design and, more importantly, the 
probability that it is ‘highly unlikely that greenhouse gas accumulation can be 
stabilized this side of the famous ‘red line’ of 450 ppm by 2020’ (Davis, 2010:29).  
 
The structure of the paper is broken down into the following areas: 
 
The first section, was Copenhagen doomed to fail before negotiations, explores the COP 15 
process itself and considers some of the reasons why the outcome to the UNFCCC’s 
climate negotiations was considered to be a disappointing response from the world’s 
political leaders, particularly after the intense two-year negotiating period following 
on from the Bali Action Plan. 
 
The second section of the paper then considers the relationship between climate 
science and its politicization. This section explores the problematic relationship 
between the dominant consensus on climate change and the way in which, as the 
stakes have increased on the need to act, political discussion has struggled to 
converge around a uniform response. It will be argued that this has become 
particularly noticeable at the global level where the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) findings have served to illustrate the divisive nature of 
international relations and moral arguments regarding historical divisions and the 
responsibility to act; changing economic relations; changing North-South power 
relations; and also the enduring strength of domestic politics.  It is suggested that one 
of the biggest contradictions facing any meaningful global climate change agreement 
is the increasing dichotomy between national aspirations to economic growth and 
the ‘window of opportunity’ through which economies must begin to converge 
around in order to avoid dangerous climate change.   
 
Providing a more comprehensive examination and a closer theoretical explication of 
these issues, the third section of the paper looks at the history and political economy of 
the UNFCCC.  The section includes both a chronological run through of the COP 
meetings since 1995, considering the work of Immanual Wallerstein (1979) as a way 
of explaining how the structuring processes of the ‘capitalist world-economy’ can 
provide insights into significant political and economic changes that have framed the 
evolution of the UNFCCC process. The section also draws from a selection of 
interview quotes from individuals who were invited to comment on the political 
history of the UNFCCC.  These are people who have been involved in the UNFCCC 
process such as government representatives, civil servants, NGOs, and climate 
scientists. The inclusion of this interview material is intended to complement the 
theoretical observations around the political evolution of the UNFCCC. 
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The final part of the paper brings the situation up to date by considering what we have 
learned from COP 15.  Considering the aftermath of COP 15, and most recent 
developments at COP 16 in Cancun, the paper suggests that national governments 
are currently incapable of the levels of cooperation which are necessary to reach 
effective global agreement on climate change.  Andonova et al (2009:52) suggest that 
environmental issues are now such a complex issue for governance that ‘governing 
mechanisms have now taken on a variety of forms beyond a reliance of effective 
multilateral agreements.  Moreover, authority is diffuse across levels of social order 
and types of actors’. Therefore, this section examines some of the other forms of 
governance and decision-making structures which are springing up in response to 
the urgency of climate change – some of which are beginning to challenge the 
traditional hegemony of nation state politics. As Chukwumerije et al (2009:58) 
suggest the increasing profile and growing influence of non-state actors, regions and 
locales, are beginning to pose important challenges for how we conceptualize the 
nature of global governance: particularly in relation to the growing threat of climate 
change.   The paper outlines the significance of this and considers where the political 
changes might emerge from in order to better close the gap between the increasing 
urgency of climate change science and the level of political will which needs to be 
engaged. 
 
 
2. Was Copenhagen doomed to fail before negotiations? 
The realities of global climate change leading up to Copenhagen were significant: 
 
 Global carbon emissions had risen at a rate of 1 per cent per annum during the 
previous decade; 
 Global energy consumption had risen at a rate of 1-1.5 per cent per annum during 
the last two decades – 90 per cent of which was based on fossil fuel use; 
 The US as the world’s largest polluter remained outside of the Kyoto Protocol; 
 Fossil fuels were predicted to remain the dominant source of energy, accounting 
for 83 per cent of the forecasted overall increase in global energy demand; 
 Carbon emissions from the developing countries India, China, Brazil and South 
Africa were on the verge of overtaking the industrialized countries by the early 
2020s where they were set to become responsible for about 70 per cent of the 
expected increase in global carbon emissions. 
 
Therefore, the COP 15 climate summit was seen as being hugely significant due to a 
number of issues which had remained unresolved within the UNFCCC political 
process.  On the eve of the summit itself, the executive secretary of the UNFCCC Yvo 
de Boer reflected on some of these difficulties and argued that success in the UN 
climate conference in Copenhagen would ultimately be measured in four ways: 
 
 To what extent the industrialized countries would be willing to reduce their 
emissions of greenhouse gases; 
 The extent to which the major developing countries such as China and India 
would be willing to go in limiting the growth of their own emissions; 
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 What kind of funding mechanisms would more effective in helping poorer 
countries to cope with the impacts of climate change; 
 Whether agreement could be reached over a more effective ‘governance 
structure’ in any future treaty agreement which took place (de Boer, 2009:1). 
 
The Copenhagen discussions were also due to take place within the context of the 
most convincing scientific evidence to date.  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report, released in 2007, had highlighted both the 
irrefutable evidence of warming and, significantly, the link between industrial 
activity and environmental degradation:  
 
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from 
observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea 
temperature. The atmospheric concentrations of CO2 and CH4 in 2005 exceed 
by far the natural range over the last 650,000 years. It is very likely that the 
observed increase in CH4 concentration is predominantly due to agriculture 
and fossil fuel use (1PCC, 2007: 30-35). 
 
Copenhagen also raised hopes that the United States might be prepared to come back 
into the fold after withdrawal from Kyoto in 2001. Yvo de Boer had been optimistic 
that the change of presidency would now become a turning point in the US position, 
with President Obama noticeably more open to the need for the US to come into line 
with the rest of the Kyoto signatories.  He reasoned that, unlike the debacle 
surrounding the US withdrawal from the Kyoto process in 2001 – where de Boer 
argued that the US delegation returned with a treaty that had little chance of passing 
through the Senate – pre-Copenhagen there was now a much more engaged 
discussion taking place between the new US delegation, the Senate, and the 
UNFCCC.    
 
De Boer also suggested that the recent global economic downturn might provide 
more optimal conditions for countries to shift their aims towards a more collective 
sustainability agenda. He pointed out that while global greenhouse gas emissions 
were expected to slow down due to shrinking industrial activities, he reasoned that 
the Copenhagen discussions might be able to take advantage of the new economic 
conditions in order to engage countries at a deeper political level.  He argued at the 
time that he felt that business was now ready to assume a more leading role in the 
debate: ‘I get the impression talking to business people that they still want clarity 
from Copenhagen.  If you’re making investments now, for example in the energy 
sector, in power plants that are going to be around for the next 30 to 50 years, you 
can’t really afford to keep waiting and waiting and waiting for governments to say 
where they’re going to go on this issue’ (de Boer, 2009:2)   
 
The importance of reaching agreement over an effective post-Kyoto global climate 
change policy encapsulated many of the hopes and fears ahead of Copenhagen 
where, with two years to run on the first phase, there was no agreement on the table 
regarding what a follow-up period might look like. For many observers the Kyoto 
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Protocol remained the most significant achievement to have been agreed during the 
UNFCCC process to date.  Technically an ‘amendment to the UNFCCC Treaty, 
assigning specific obligatory emissions cuts to each of the signatories’ Walker and 
King (2008:180), the Kyoto Protocol was originally designed to be the ‘teeth’ by 
which the UNFCCC would be able to deliver on its principal aims of stabilizing GHG 
emissions to a level which would avoid irreversible climate change.   Thus, it was felt 
that Copenhagen was now an opportunity to improve on the design of the Kyoto 
‘flexibility mechanisms’ in order to ratchet-up the 5 per cent reduction in global 
emissions that they had originally been developed to achieve.  While some critics 
have argued that Kyoto has actually achieved minimal progress in galvanizing 
collective agreement to reduce carbon emissions, others have argued that it had at 
least set in place a recognizable global policy framework, within which signatories 
could work towards both stabilization and reduction of carbon emissions.  As Walker 
and King point out: ‘although the original 5 per cent figure was acknowledged to be 
too low to make a significant difference to the problem, it was always intended to be 
a first step, after which levels would be ratcheted upwards’ (2008:180).  Supporters 
argued therefore that it was imperative that a post-Kyoto package needed to be 
agreed upon in Copenhagen Summit in order to build on this progress.  Therefore, 
much of the urgency surrounding COP 15 related to the fact that the present 
agreement is due to end in 2012.  
 
However, Davis (2020:37) has argued that faith ‘in climate diplomacy based on the 
Kyoto-Copenhagen template assumed that, once the major actors had accepted the 
consensus science in the IPCC reports, they would recognize an overriding common 
interest in gaining control over the greenhouse effect’.  Based in this assumption, he 
argues that any optimism around the COP-15 Summit was never likely to be 
realized, particularly in consideration of the political problems and compromises 
preceding the Copenhagen discussions. While Timmons Roberts et al (2004:22) 
pointed out that the urgency of climate change – alongside the heightened profile of 
global sustainability issues since the 1970s – has continued to highlight the need for 
an effective, transnational system of regulation, they argue that it remains to be seen 
whether the UNFCCC would be the political framework that is capable of achieving 
this.   
 
 
3. Politics and the politicization of climate science: a brief history   
Limits to Growth (1972) was the first significant scientific study to consider the 
relationship between humans and the environment and what the longer-term effects 
of human activity on global eco-systems might be.  The first scientific study of this 
kind to use a ‘systems approach’ and an early form of computer modeling design, 
Meadows et al argued that there would prove to be limits on material resources in 
relation to predicted levels of global economic growth and international trade.  As 
Peters (2001:69) points out, ‘the combination of a rapidly growing population and 
ultimately limited planetary resources, meant that per capita food output, energy use 
and industrial production would decline substantially unless ‘throughput’ were 
significantly reduced through time’.  Meadows et al made the argument that these 
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issues would come into tangency approximately between the period spanning 2025 
to 2050.  The study was also significant in that it raised the concern that levels of 
pollution were now endangering the environment and threatening the world’s eco-
systems. The authors of Limits to Growth suggested that there was a need to tackle 
these problems by attempting to bridge more sustainable utilization of resources 
through research and technological development, which could be further supported 
by necessary changes to the current influences of human values and lifestyles 
(Turner, 1997).  The authors of Limits to Growth were subject to widespread criticism 
subsequent to the original report.  Turner (1997) has argued for instance the 
theorizing behind Limits to Growth was based upon a weak data-base; an argument 
corroborated by Kneese and Riker (1972) who suggest that: 
 
The authors load their case by letting some things grow exponentially and 
others not.  Population, capital and pollution grow exponentially in all 
models, but technologies for expanding resources and controlling pollution 
are permitted to grow, if at all, only in discrete increments (Kneese and Riker, 
1972:103). 
 
Others such as Peter Victor (2008:90) have since suggested that Limits to Growth was 
visionary in its ‘critical appraisal of the future prospects for economic and population 
growth at the global level and the questioning of the sustainability of such a model’.  
Thus, while Victor acknowledges some of the flaws in the original model and some 
of the trends that were identified as concerns which may lay ahead for the western 
model of capitalism, he suggests that its impact was originally tempered by its 
implied challenge to the hegemonic influence of ‘politicians, business leaders and 
economists in overseeing’, what had been up to then, a period of 25 years of 
uninterrupted growth.   
The Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, held in 1972, introduced 
many of the same points on sustainability into the global political arena through the 
United Nations political forum.  The Stockholm Conference is generally recognized 
as the first attempt to engage an international response to the increasing awareness 
of rising levels of pollution and the possibility of global resource depletion.  As well 
as signposting many of the concerns raised in Limits to Growth, the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference was significant in that it triggered three particular institutional changes 
which would begin to challenge the ways in which western governments would both 
perceive and address environmental issues in the future: 
 Firstly, it signified the growing importance of recognising that polluting activities 
and environmental degradation should now become very real concerns at a 
political level; 
 Secondly, it specified that the political framework of the debate would be 
globally defined as accumulating evidence pointed to the trans-national 
implications of environmental issues; 
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 Thirdly, the Stockholm Summit set in motion an agenda for further action and 
precedents that would be taken in the future on environmental policy initiatives. 
In order to provide a steering mechanism for this programme, the United Nations 
Environmental Programme (UNEP) was established in order to orchestrate the 
difference levels of governance and decision making procedures which would be 
needed to oversee the 26 principles agreed related to the environment and 
development which were agreed upon during the Stockholm Summit.  Initially, these 
mostly revolved around concern over the effects of CFCs on the depletion of the 
ozone layer, although the threat of global warming was also raised as an issue to be 
addressed as part of a future global environmental agenda. Significantly, the 
Stockholm discussions – and the environmental debate in general – also witnessed 
the growing influence of environmental groups such as the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF), Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth (FoE) on more formal political 
processes. Paterson (2001:142) has suggested that the growing influence of this 
‘world civic politics’ now saw the beginnings of a transition in traditional forms of 
political dialogue and engagement that had previously been embedded within 
regimes, interstate processes, and top-down approaches. Figure 1 illustrates the 
principal channels by which environmental policy began to ‘stretch’ national policy 
upwards towards the global level and to ‘determine a nation-state’s position on an 
international environmental agreement: state, market, science, and civil society’ 
(Fisher, 2004:9). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The role of different actors in environmental decision making (Fisher, 2004:9). 
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3.1 The formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
It was another seven years before the first World Climate Conference took place in 
1979 following increased scientific evidence which pointed to a damaging link 
between fossil-fuel consumption and changes in the earth’s climate.  As the gathering 
concluded: ‘the conference finds that it is now urgently necessary for the nations of 
the world to foresee and to prevent potential man-made changes in climate that 
might be adverse to the well-being of humanity’ (World Climate Conference, cited in 
Gupta, 2001:12).  Economic downturn marginalized environmental concerns to a 
large degree subsequent to this period but they re-emerged during the 1980s through 
concerns over acid rain, ozone depletion and again climate change.  In response to 
the a number of international conferences which succeeded the 1979 World Climate 
Conference, 1980’s World Conservation Strategy, and the subsequent emergence of 
the Brundtland Report in 1987 were also influential in directing policy towards 
‘global sustainability’ and greater recognition of the link between environmental 
degradation and economic growth. The Brundtland Report was significant in 
arguing that effective environmental policies could not be constructed in isolation 
from wider global economic and political issues.  During this time, as Vogler 
(2008:353) has argued: ‘it was clear that for the countries of the South, environmental 
questions could not be separated from their demands for development, aid, and the 
restructuring of international economic relations’.   
 
As Fisher (2004:25) has pointed out: ‘during the 1980s and 1990s, the increasing 
number of international conferences which took place that included the participation 
of scientists, governments and policy makers’, eventually culminated in the 
formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC itself 
was formed as part of collaboration between the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Association (WMA) in order to 
‘assess the state of existing knowledge about the climate system and climate change; 
the environmental, economic, and social impacts of climate change; and the possible 
response strategies’ (UNEP, 2010:1).  As Fisher (2004:25) explains: ‘the purpose of the 
IPCC is not to conduct original scientific research; rather, the IPCC was set up to 
synthesize and summarize the research taking place around the world’.   In this way, 
from its initial implementation, the main function of the IPCC has been to draw upon 
this global research network in order to produce periodic assessment reports on the 
current state of the science of climate change and to advise on actions through which 
to address scientific findings.  Significantly therefore, the IPCC process also involves, 
as Fisher notes, ‘the release of a “summary for policy makers”, created by the authors 
of each assessment review and approved by nation-states involved in the process’ 
(2004:25).  Watson (2001) suggests that the power held by the IPCC as a political 
influence on global environmental governance occurs through the intergovernmental 
process is activated by the summarized research which is given to policy makers, 
offering the IPCC a unique position to be able to engage with a wide range of 
different organizations and specialist agencies in order to be able to inform 
effectively on the perceived complexities of the debate.   
 
The Rio Declaration two years later provided a global forum for the links which were 
now beginning to take place between the latest scientific research on the environment 
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and the global political realm.  As Vogler (2008:354) points out: ‘the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) or ‘Earth Summit’, was the 
largest international conference so far held, raising the profile of the environment as 
an international issue while concluding several significant documents, such as 
Agenda 21 and international conventions on climate change and the preservation of 
biodiversity’. A new global agenda on addressing environment and development 
issues in tandem was enshrined in the document Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.  One of the most significance developments to come out of the Rio 
Declaration was that it furthered progress towards a political response on climate 
change at the global level, not least through the institutionalization of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which was aimed at 
exploring ways in which to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions through the 
ongoing construction of a global legal framework.  As Vogler (2008:358) points out: 
there was always an acknowledgement that international cooperation would be 
reliant upon shared scientific understanding through which to provide the basis for 
future action. 
 
3.2 Integrating science and politics through economics 
The challenge right from the very early days of trying to initiate political action on 
climate change has been how to accommodate current scientific research into 
effective action at a policy level.  The situation becomes even more complex when the 
sheer scale of the political coordination needed to frame a global agenda around 
climate change science is considered. Timmons Roberts et al (2004) wonder whether 
the UNFCCC can ever be capable of reaching the necessary degree of consensus on 
the critical policy aims and objectives through which to overcome what Hurrell and 
Kingsbury (1992:1) have described as ‘a fragmented and often highly conflictual 
political system made up of over 170 sovereign states and numerous other actors in 
order to achieve the high (and historically unprecedented) levels of 
cooperation and policy coordination needed to manage environmental problems on a 
global scale’.    
 
The primary discourse through which the IPCC has tried to provide an influence on 
the science-politics interface has been to encourage a decision making process 
characterized by what is known as ‘the precautionary principle’.  As the World 
Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (2005:8) points 
out: ‘within the United Nations system, the precautionary principle is included in the 
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change’.  Accordingly, Principle 15 sets out what 
it sees as the signatories’ responsibilities to take action according to the latest 
scientific findings on climate change: 
 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities.  Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
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environmental degradation (The Rio Declaration, Principle 15 
http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/precaution-7.html)  
 
The precautionary principle attempts to negotiate some of the uncertainties that were 
outlined above by introducing a moral norm, whereby, in the absence of scientific 
consensus, actions which are taken which might lead to adverse consequences or 
unacceptable levels of risk, for instance to the public or to the environment, will be 
carried by those who were instrumental in advocating the initial action.  Thus, the 
advent of the UNFCCC took place under these premises, where the framework for 
debate continues to be guided by the principle that signatories have an obligation to 
either reduce carbon emissions or to monitor the carbon intensity of their economies 
despite the absence of unanimity in climate change science.    
 
Giddens (2009) has argued that the precautionary principle remains a minefield of 
philosophical and practical complexities and ultimately questions its validity as a 
guiding framework for an effective global climate change policy.  While advocates of 
the precautionary principle argue that it offers the degree of ‘flexibility’ which is 
necessary in order to try to align 192 economic and political models to the 
uncertainty which continues to frame climate change science, Giddens argues that 
signatories have often interpreted the application of the precautionary principle – 
and more importantly the responsibilities which emerge from the implications of 
Principle 15 – in quite diverse ways; very often ways which militate against finding 
areas of common political ground.  Right from the start for instance, developing 
countries made the argument that the costs of mitigation, and the fact that action on 
climate change would invariably constitute a ‘trade-off’ with other national priorities 
such as poverty reduction, mean that the onus on these actions should initially fall on 
the developed world.  However, as the next section of the document will argue, 
where this responsibility would lie within the global policy framework of the 
UNFCCC has been the subject of heated discussion both across the North-South 
boundary and also within developed nations.  The US, for instance, argued in 2001 
that the uncertainties around climate science, alongside anticipated costs of 
implementing the Kyoto mitigation strategies, meant that they were unwilling to 
ratify the protocol.  The latter was also an argument pursued by Australia who also 
felt that the costs of implementing Kyoto outweighed any environmental gains 
which might be made.   
 
Walker and King (2008:157) suggest that the complex relationship between science 
and politics invariably revolves around the extent to which more direct regulation 
can be aligned to an emphasis on faith in a market approach to mitigation.  As Gill 
(2003) has observed, the increasing influence of globalization from the period of the 
late 1960s has seen the emergence of a ‘new world order’ based increasingly around 
liberal capitalism and the accompanying revolution in information and 
communications technologies.  It is arguably the ideology of liberal capitalism which 
has provided the biggest push to this agenda and what Griffiths et al describe as: 
 
The conjunction of liberal values (freedom, human rights, individualism, and 
democracy) with an economic system based on the market.  This world view 
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is widely held to have triumphed over communism and the idea of a planned 
economy, resulting in an international environment conducive to the free 
movement of capital and goods (Griffiths et al, 2009:132) 
 
IPCC recommendations on climate change mitigation try to stay within this 
paradigm, suggesting that effective use of market-based instruments can be effective 
in closing the gap between business-as-usual energy use and the latest climate 
change science.  Lohmann (2006) suggests that this is one notable way in which 
effective communication between the science of climate change and politics is able to 
take place. Lohmann notes that it is clear that the pervasive influence of the market in 
framing the agenda means that an ‘objective science which stands outside of any 
social context isn’t an option – a comment that has led Shackley et al to observe that 
‘scientists may as well accept this particular politicization of climate science as a 
given and try and find ways to cope constructively with such a political reality’ 
(Shackley et al, cited in Lohmann, 2006).   
 
Ingham and Ulph (2005) suggest that one of the central issues for policy-makers 
negotiating within this market/science interface has been the high degree of 
uncertainty surrounding the elements and decisions which must be considered in 
constructing effective policies within a market framework where values and 
timelines are all important.  Despite ever more convincing evidence and the high 
degree of global scientific consensus from the four scientific assessment reports 
compiled by the IPCC since 1990, there remains no absolute measurement involved 
in assessing both the processes and the consequences of changes which have altered 
the earth’s climate.  Subsequently, governments and decision-makers are still unable 
to operate from clear-cut scientific forecasts regarding both the time and the scale of 
future scenarios and also to adequately gage the influence of ‘other human and 
natural factors in affecting the earth’s climate’ (Grubb et al, 1999:26).  Consequently, 
as Ingham and Ulph suggest, there can be no real measurement of future impacts 
‘caused by changes on society and the economy; the extent of adaptations that might 
take place; and the economic value to be attached to these impacts’ (2005:43).   
 
As Walker and King point out, many economists have argued that providing large-
scale investment on climate change mitigation at the moment is simply unrealistic 
due to the unpredictability of scientific scenarios and consequently the financial risks 
attached to strategies which might be adopted.  The weight of opinion from many 
economists (and apparent to some degree in the US decision to withdrawal from 
Kyoto) was that future economic discounting should be based on the premise of 
ensuring continued economic growth, where future wealth could be utilized to deal 
with what was arguably a future problem.  There was a high degree of economic 
consensus that a commitment to large-scale investment to address climate change at 
this time would damage economic growth and with it the capacity to deal with long-
term environmental problems. 
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3.3 The Stern Review 
Many of these assumptions were laid open to challenge with the appearance of the 
Stern Review.  The Stern Review, which appeared at the end of 2006, was financed by 
the UK Government, was written and coordinated by the UK economist Nicholas 
Stern and is the most comprehensive economic analysis to have been made to date in 
assessing and evaluating future impacts concerning the threat of climate change.  
Confirming fears in the UK concerning the need for greater urgency in addressing 
climate change debate that had been expressed by the Royal Commission in 2000, 
Stern argued that climate security presents an altogether different challenge to 
policy-makers from more conventional market problems.   
 
Flying against the conventional economic orthodoxy of the time, the Stern Review 
reasoned that climate change is the biggest market failure we have so far 
encountered.  It made the case for this by reiterating the dominant scientific 
consensus present in the three reports that had been compiled by the IPCC up to that 
point and the argument that climate change is almost certainly occurring as a result 
of human interference in the natural order, where the predominant use of fossil fuels 
as a proportion of GDP in the production and dissemination of energy must be 
considered to be the principal cause.  Stern and his colleagues also warned that there 
would already need to be a degree of adaptation to some of the already observed 
effects of global climate change, and it made a recommendation that, in the UK, the 
aim of cutting 60% of greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 should now provide a 
realistic long-term framework to work within.  Stern believe that this would set an 
example to the rest of the world that the UK was now committed to exploring the 
most appropriate options in order to align policy in the UK with the latest scientific 
evidence on climate change. 
 
Perhaps the biggest statement made by the Stern Review was the proposition that the 
costs of tacking climate change could actually be estimated to be around 1 per cent of 
global GDP per capita consumption a year at a value of 500-550 ppm CO2eq (Walker 
and King, 2008).  Significantly, Stern made the case that postponing action on climate 
change, as many of the leading economists were then advocating, would itself prove 
to be much more costly and would more likely lead to a situation where unabated 
climate change could eventually cost 20 per cent of global GDP consumption a year.  
Stern has subsequently been criticized for using a low discount rate alongside what 
some have argued to be an unusually high predictive insight in regard to future 
climate change impacts and their costs in his models.  Walker and King point out 
that some critics suggest that Stern built these assumptions into his models in order 
to reflect his own arguments regarding the urgency to take action.  However, Wall 
(2008) points out that the significance of the Stern Review is that, while it clearly 
remains tied to arguments around economic theory – and some of the assumptions 
which often structure debates on cost-benefit analyses – it makes the point of 
emphasizing the long and short term implications of inaction and of failing to 
respond to developments and innovations in climate change science. In a reflection 
on the political implications of the report, Wall reasons: ‘the Stern Review on the 
Economics of Climate Change has forced even hardened neo-liberals to acknowledge 
that there is now a serious problem’ (2008:1).    
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Perhaps the biggest message to emerge from the Stern Review was in its exhortation 
for policy makers to ‘listen to the science’ and to let scientific expertise lead the 
debate in a much more direct way.  Following the Stern Review, the findings of the 
IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, provided evidence to show that, in order to 
avoid dangerous climate change – where future generations would begin to face a 
spiral of unpredictable weather consequences – the global community would have to 
stabilize levels of greenhouse gases in the environment to 450 parts per million and 
should try to limit further temperature increases to within 2 to 2.5 degrees.  
Therefore, while Stern had made an economic case for 500-550 ppm CO2eq at a cost 
of 1 per cent of global GDP, Walker and King (2008:162) argued that the latest IPCC 
scientific findings corroborated growing scientific opinion – which had gathered a 
degree of consensus around the time of the G8 Summit which had been held in the 
UK in 2005 – that in order to get greenhouse gases down to the most accurate 
scientific level of risk management, global CO2 emissions would now need to peak 
within the next fifteen years.   
 
Much of the scientific case which was used to present policy makers with this revised 
figure, revolved around what climate scientists argued was the increased evidence 
for the possibility of climate ‘feedback mechanisms’ and ‘tipping points’ – which 
they argued made the case for immediate political action much more urgent.  These 
revised scientific scenarios now influenced a change in the overall debate and, 
significantly, moved the recommended stabilization levels downwards from the 
previous figure of 550 ppm to a new figure of 450 ppm.  This new figure was later 
corroborated by research findings from both the International Energy Agency (2008) 
and the World Energy Outlook (2008).  The 2007 IPCC report argued that in order to 
achieve this new target, developed nations would have to reduce their emissions by 
around 60-80 per cent, with developing countries looking for a reduction of around 
25-40 per cent.   
 
This now looked to be a more daunting challenge for policy makers, particularly 
with regard to how this could be framed in economic terms. Stern’s original low-cost 
economic rationale for political action was now becoming more tenuous in relation to 
newer scientific evidence.  The new scientific recommendations were also significant 
due to the fact that trends in global energy consumption had been increasing on a 
average of 1 – 1.5% per annum since 1990 and that 90% of this energy use remained 
based on the use of fossil fuels.  The size of the task facing political leaders in the 
aftermath of the Fourth Assessment Report is shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 where the 
IPCC research had compared energy trends to the latest scientific consensus findings 
on stabilization scenarios: 
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Figure 2: The growth in global energy use 1900-1997 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Pathways towards atmospheric greenhouse gas stabilization 
 
 
Despite these figures, it was hoped that the findings from the 2007 IPCC would now 
provide the baseline figures through which effective policy strategies would now be 
mobilized.  As the figure 3 table shows, these findings argued that 2 degrees – and a 
related 450 parts per million CO2 atmospheric percentage level – should now be the 
absolute minimum aim for policy makers in order to avoid creating an irreversible 
situation.   
 
However, during this period, James Hansen from Columbia University offered 
another line of thought on the debate.  According to 350.org, the organization of 
which Hansen is a member, the world had already passed the amount of carbon 
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dioxide in the atmosphere which could be considered ‘safe’.  As their research 
pointed out:  
 
In 2007, with the rapid melt of Arctic ice, it became clear that we have already 
crossed serious thresholds.  A number of other signs pointed in the same 
direction: the spike in methane emissions, likely from thawing permafrost; 
the melt of high altitude glazier systems and perennial icepack in Asia, 
Europe, South America and North America; the rapid and unexpected 
acidification of seawater.  All of these things implied the same thing: 
wherever the red line for danger was, we were already past it, even though 
the atmospheric concentration of CO2 was only 390 parts per million and the 
temperature increase just a shade below 1 degree (350.org, 
http://www.350.org/understanding-350#9, 2010: 2). 
 
Citing the above scenarios, Hansen makes the argument that current IPCC research 
itself inherently underestimates the damage which has already been done to the 
Earth’s eco-systems by global climate change.  Furthermore, he suggested that IPCC 
science figures remained too high in their recommendations that policy strategies 
should take the figures of 450 ppm and 2 degrees respectively as a ‘red line’ 
stabilization figure for action in the present.  Accordingly, Hansen reasons that in 
order to avoid dangerous climate change, then global policy measures should now 
be aimed at reducing atmospheric concentrations of global greenhouse gas emissions 
to a figure of 350 ppm rather than continuing to push that level higher.  What 
Hansen is arguing in effect, is that there is no window for the world to keep 
expanding emissions into and that we must now reduce to a figure below the current 
390 ppm if we were to be serious about returning the planet to equilibrium. 
 
While Hansen is in agreement that policy makers must listen more clearly to the 
science, he argues that there is no room for the current environmental space for 
countries to develop into: particularly within the current predominant model of 
economic growth, which remains fossil fuel intensive.  Significantly, Hansen has 
argued that a strategy more in alignment with the more recent warnings of changing 
weather and climate conditions would involve a revision of the current prioritization 
of economic growth for all nations (Daly, 2009), alongside an associated break from 
the use of fossil fuels (Lohmann, 2006).  Vogler (2008) has pointed out that such a 
break would mean a radical departure from current ways in living in the West for 
example, where if everyone on the planet were to live according to the lifestyles 
currently adopted by European citizens, then we would need three planets’ worth of 
resources and environmental sinks in order to maintain existing levels of 
consumption and living standards (Vogler, 2008).  Vogler has argued that if these 
figures were mapped according the living patterns of the United States, then this has 
been estimated to translate into the depletion of five planets’ worth of future 
resources (WWF, 2008).  While there is currently no scientific consensus on the extent 
of resource depletion and the capacity of the earth’s sinks to engage with current 
levels of pollution, the increasing concern is that a business-as-usual trajectory for 
modern industrial civilization ‘characterized by high technology, energy-intensive 
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means of production and mass consumption’ will continue to put an increased 
burden on the Earth’s resources (Pearson and Rochester, 2000:553).  
 
4. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change  
 
While environmental planners and managers may want to do their work 
without political interference, using rational and objective knowledge only, 
the selection of both expertise and experts is a highly political process which 
allows the institutions of science and professional expertise to become 
important actors in the selection of environmental and policy goals and 
especially instruments (Boehmer-Christiansen,1994:69).  
 
It is not only the growing influence of the UNFCCC that is indicative of greater 
international collaboration on sustainable development.  Multilateral institutions 
such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organization both integrate this aim 
into their policy agendas and are gaining a higher profile, for instance, in trying to 
coordinate sustainable trading arrangements into international agreements.  While 
the growing regional integration of the EU, ASEA, and NAFTA has indicated the 
ongoing development of more transnational systems of governance and intra-state 
policy-making, the growing centrality of energy and environmental issues has also 
served to highlight the argument proposed by Vogler (2005:204) who makes the 
observation that: ‘because there is no overarching political authority at the global 
level and the authority to regulate lies with around 200 sovereign states, the 
solutions to trans-boundary and global environmental problems have to be sought 
through interstate cooperation.  This is particularly so regarding the ‘global 
commons’ – the oceans, Antarctica, outer space and the atmosphere’.   
 
Despite both the scientific and political disputes around climate change, and the 
divergent opinions on what should or shouldn’t be the most appropriate course of 
action, the interrelationship between the UNFCCC and the IPCC, remains the 
principle organizational body through which policy-makers attempt to organize 
science and politics into a workable, global policy framework.   
 
There was always awareness that directing UNFCCC signatories increasingly 
towards engaging with the above strategy would never be a straightforward process, 
but it was hoped that Article 2 of the UNFCCC would set in motion the guiding 
framework through which to work towards longer term aims and objectives on 
global climate change:  
 
The ultimate objective of the Convention…is to achieve…stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.  Such 
a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems 
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner (Article 2 of the UNFCCC document, cited in Grubb et al, 1999:37). 
  
21
Figure 4 illustrates how the political process of constructing a global low-carbon 
future might work in practice:  
            
                      
 
Global, low-carbon future (IPCC science) 
 
 
 
Common but differentiated responsibilities (signatory politics) 
 
Figure 4: The political process of constructing a global low-carbon future 
 
 
As Grubb et al (1999:37) have clarified regarding the urgency of the need to change a 
‘business-as-usual’ approach to current levels of energy use and consumption 
practices at the transnational level: ‘the core objective [of the UNFCCC] is thus to 
contain the rate of change within safe limits and ultimately to stabilize the 
atmosphere at safe levels’.  While they point out that the terms ‘stabilization’, 
‘interference’ and ‘ecosystem adaptation’ have themselves yet to be defined, clarified 
and clearly aligned to concrete policy goals, the ultimate aim of the UNFCCC is to 
provide a political framework through which to enable climate change mitigation 
and to change the ‘business-as-usual’ approach of many of the signatories.  The ‘gap’ 
which will exist at any one time in this process – that is the space between 
signatories’ actions and their willingness to adjust environment and energy goals 
towards UNFCCC recommendations – will invariably occur according to perceptions 
of ‘basic state goals such as physical security, recognition by others and economic 
development and also according to how states see themselves in relation to other 
states in international society’ (Griffiths, 2008:123). 
 
As Vrolijk (2002:xxxiv) observes ‘parties to the UN Framework Convention 
committed themselves to stabilize GHG concentrations at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.  Following on from 
its agreement in the 1992 Rio Declaration, The UNFCCC was initially legally non-
binding in these respects and contained no enforcement provisions.  It was however 
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intended to provide the first steps towards instigating both a legal framework for 
reducing emissions and also for reaching the relevant degree of political consensus 
on how this was to be achieved.   Therefore, one of the innovations introduced by the 
original treaty was the establishment of a National Greenhouse Gas Inventory whereby 
signatories to the UNFCCC would be required to submit national audits on their 
emission levels.  It was intended that these audits would then form the basis for a 
commitment to future quantified targets for each signatory.   The first few COP 
meetings (Conference of the Parties) were therefore concerned with trying to reach 
agreement over the legal and technical details of the UNFCCC, which were fleshed 
out during the following three years in Berlin, Geneva and 1997’s Kyoto negotiations.  
    
4.1 Theorizing the UNFCCC: world systems theory, international relations, and 
global climate change 
As this section will suggest, the UNFCCC process, and its proposed methodology for 
addressing global climate change, has become something of a metaphor for long-
standing political values which serve to remind us of the ways and the processes 
through which the world is both connected and disconnected.  Climate change itself 
– and also the increasing profile of energy security – has been instrumental in 
challenging, for instance, traditional ideas of national sovereignty, governing 
mechanisms and highlighting the way in which the transnational status of these 
issues invariably situates different actors, states and trading blocs in interaction, 
cooperation and competition with each other in trying to control and/or exploit the 
world’s natural resources.  Consequently, Boehmer-Christianson (1994) makes the 
observation that ‘perhaps the main problem with the UNFCCC is that the 1992 
Framework Convention on Climate Change was not negotiated primarily to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions but rather as part of a wider bargain between rich and 
poor countries, competing energy interests, and governments faced with growing 
economic problems making investments in the future increasingly more essential but 
also more difficult’ (Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994:27).   
 
Reconciling difference through ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
As argued in the last section, the UNFCCC’s strategy for all discussions subsequent 
to 1992 has revolved around an agreed framework for signatories to converge 
around the UNFCCC’s aim to encourage a political dialogue around ‘common but 
differentiated responsibilities’. Subsequent policy developments therefore have 
always been underpinned by a commitment to incorporate the following four 
objectives in the policy framework of the UNFCCC:  
 
 The need to protect the climate system ‘on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with [states’] common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead’; 
 ‘The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable’ (e.g. the low-lying island states 
and the primary fossil fuel exporters); 
 The need for precautionary measures in the absence of full scientific certainty,’ 
qualified by the need to be ‘cost effective’ and ‘comprehensive’, i.e. to take into 
account all sources and sinks, adaptation and all economic sectors; 
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 ‘Parties have the right to and should promote sustainable development 
integrated with national development programmes’, and they ‘should cooperate 
to promote a supportive and open international economic system.  Measures 
taken…should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on international trade’ (Grubb et al, 1999:38-39). 
 
These four issues constitute the four components of the ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’ pathway by which it was hoped that the UNFCCC process could 
encourage the degree of centralization which would be necessary in order to direct 
framework signatories’ indigenous policies towards increased environmental 
responsibility around safeguarding the ‘global commons’.   
 
As this section will argue, how this convergence will actually occur remains 
politically contentious, and the lifetime of the UNFCCC itself has been a political 
struggle over the meaning of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ and how 
this is to be translated into meaningful action.  While IPCC recommendations on the 
science of climate change have yet to converge around an agreed ‘stabilization level’, 
and as scientists continue to work towards squaring scientific knowledge on ‘safe 
levels’ of atmospheric greenhouse concentration levels with political action (Albrecht 
and Arts, 2005), the UNFCCC procedures currently encourage mitigation strategies in 
developed countries and adaptation in developing countries.  Similarly, signatories in 
developed countries are subject to a variety of reduction or stabilization targets – 
contained in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol – whereas developing countries are not 
subject to targets but are encouraged to reduce emissions through sustainable 
development programmes; often through activation of the ‘flexibility mechanisms’ 
that are intended to stimulate investment flows from developed countries seeking 
the buy carbon credits from Non-Annex I countries in order to offset their own 
emission levels. 
 
Article 4 of the UNFCCC and Article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol both provide the 
guidelines for involved parties to formulate, construct and oversee relevant domestic 
policies and measures through which to contribute towards the aims and the future 
direction of the UNFCCC.  Again, the more stringent measures are currently aimed 
at developed countries where relevant parties are encouraged to develop more 
autonomously based domestic policies – particularly in areas such as energy and 
transport – which will more directly address point sources of greenhouse gas 
emissions and the direct causes of climate change.  As Albrecht and Arts (2005:887) 
point out, this will generally involve utilizing policy mechanisms regarding 
‘increased energy efficiency levels and sustainable energy structures; enabling 
sustainable agriculture; promoting the elimination of market imperfections and 
adverse state subsidies; and other measures of adaptation relating the possible 
consequences of climate change’.   As already argued, while developing countries are 
not subject to quantitative targets regarding emissions reductions, they are required 
to submit annual audits on their emission levels and also strategies regarding 
projects which can be developed with the cooperation of Annex I countries under the 
Bonn initiated Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).   
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4.2 Framing ‘ common but differentiated responsibilities’ in policy 
Reflecting the above actions concerning the ways in which effective policies at this 
level must incorporate the global, political nature of climate change, signatories to 
the UNFCCC are divided according to four different groups: 
 
Annex I countries:  Thirty six of the parties signed to the Kyoto Protocol are developed 
counties with the EU constituting a signatory in its own right.   The Annex I 
countries are the industrialized nations and these countries are required to meet 
specific targets that have been specified for them in the Treaty in regard to reducing 
future greenhouse gas emissions.  The emphasis on targeting emissions reductions 
according to the protocols set out in Annex I reflect the degree of responsibility that 
many feel should be apportioned for the current climate problem.  Walker and King 
(2008) argue that much of the political bargaining up to and subsequent to Kyoto has 
revolved around the fact that the industrialized nations have reached their stage of 
development through the exploitation of cheap fossil fuels and are therefore 
primarily responsible for the present levels of pollution.  It is also argued that most of 
the nations in Annex I are also better positioned than developing countries in 
supplying the technology and resources which will be needed to address climate 
change in policy; 
 
Annex II countries: This sub-group constitutes the developed countries which have 
primary responsibility to pay the costs of the developing countries.  The twenty-three 
countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and The United 
States of America.  The European Union is also a member as a separate political 
entity and Turkey was removed from Annex II in 2001 in order to be recognized as a 
transitional economy (see below); 
 
Annex I countries (transitional economies): A sub-set of the Annex I countries are those 
who have been ranked as constituting transitional economies.  These include 
countries such as Turkey, Russia and the Ukraine who are members of the OECD but 
are in the process of moving from a centrally planned economy to adopting the 
principles of the free-market.  The transitional economies are grouped as a sub-set of 
Annex I and are therefore subject to reduction measures.  There is however an 
acknowledgement that they do not currently possess the same resources or 
technological capacities as full Annex I countries; 
 
Non-Annex I Countries:  One hundred and thirty seven developing nations have so far 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  As argued above, the financial and political status of 
developing countries reflects what is felt to be the historical role of industrialized 
nations in contributing to current atmospheric levels of greenhouse gas emissions.  
While the rising emissions of China, India, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa in 
particular have created political controversy over the cogency of this argument – not 
least through the refusal of the USA to ratify the because of failure to impose 
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reduction levels on these countries – all signatories that have been designated as 
developing nations are currently exempt from reducing current levels of pollution 
due to agreements that have been brokered over their own developmental needs.  
Importantly however, as Walker and King (2008:198) point out, ‘these countries also 
tend to produce only very small amounts of greenhouse gas per individual citizen’.  
Thus, while the development of non-Annexed countries has been historically 
negligible in relation to the problem of climate change, ‘their current development 
needs also tends to swamp all other political and economic considerations’.   
 
While it was generally agreed that this ‘division of labour’ might be the best 
framework through which to incorporate the organizational structure of the 
UNFCCC, Grubb et al (1999:38) point out that there remain important political 
disputes as to how these divisions might become reconciled towards a common goal.  
Timmons Roberts and Parks (2007) argue in fact that while the original ethos of the 
UNFCCC was quite clearly to try to integrate environmental aims to broader 
questions around global inequality, development, and sustainability, this division of 
labour also provides important signposts to why the UNFCCC process continues to 
fall short of effective collaboration towards a global low-carbon future.  As Grubb et 
al (1999) have pointed out:   
 
Developing countries originally argued that a major factor [in these divisions] 
was the historical ‘debt’ arising from the much higher past emissions of 
industrialized countries, which have monopolized the available 
‘environmental space’ of the planet.  The United States argued that past 
emissions were a matter of history, and that current generations could not be 
held accountable for this; the need for developed countries to take the lead 
was simply a reflection of their current relative wealth.  This dispute is likely 
to resurface when attempts are made to reach agreements which require 
closer specification of the meaning of ‘on the basis of equity’ (Grubb et al, 
1999:38).   
 
Timmons Roberts and Parks (2007) point out that ‘over the last twenty years, the 
theoretical literature in international environmental relations has blossomed’ with 
scholars arguing variously that environmental policy outcomes at the global level 
have occurred as the result of the influence of: 
 
 Material self-interest; 
 Bargaining power and the ability to strong-arm weaker states through more 
coercive forms of power; 
 The importance of exogenous shocks and crises; 
 A scientific ‘burden of proof’; 
 The influence of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs); 
 Post-materialist values; 
 Epistemic communities; 
 Transnational activist networks; 
 The growth and influence of intergovernmental organizations; 
 Political leadership (Timmons Roberts and Parks, 2007:5). 
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They suggest that whilst all of the above can make a contribution to our 
understanding of the dynamics and influences of transnational environmental 
politics, they argue that it remains significant that the primary focus in the 
international relations literature on global environmental politics maintains a 
primary focus on ‘studying a world whose most important characteristic is division’, 
when it is actually the structures and processes by which such division is encouraged 
which provides a better explanation of what is really happening (Grifiths et al, 
2010:341). Concurring with this observation, Timmons Roberts and Park point out 
that the negligible focus on the role of global inequality in both the organizational 
politics of the UNFCCC and much of the literature which attempts to make sense of 
it, betrays the way in which interconnection constitutes probably the most basic 
structural influence by which UNFCCC signatories relate to each other in the global 
political economy. Drawing upon Wallerstein’s (1979) idea of ‘world systems theory’,  
Timmons Roberts and Parks suggest that ‘the small body of theoretical work that 
does exist on the topic, rarely provides clear causal explanations of how inequality 
matters and under what conditions it affects outcomes in international 
environmental politics’ (Timmons Roberts and Parks, 2007:5).   
 
Consequently, Timmons Roberts and Parks have developed the argument that one of 
the first problems with the UNFCCC as the focal point of international negotiations 
around climate change, relates to the ways in which both the debate and the 
organizing framework for discussion serves to reflect and reinforce current and 
historical systemic inequalities within a ‘problem structure’ rather than serving as a 
political forum through which to address these underlying causal processes. It is 
argued therefore that, while the division of signatories into the different groupings 
outlined in the previous section is intended to encourage cooperation, there is an 
argument to suggest that these divisions remain symptomatic of historical and 
current power relationships in the global political economy.   
 
Consequently, as Griffiths et al (2010:341) point out, ‘while we may harbour a desire 
to study international relations in order to bring states and peoples closer together, 
the starting point is a potentially united world that is actually divided in political, 
economic and cultural terms.  Although world-system theorists would not deny that 
such divisions exist, they would argue that the best way of understanding them is by 
locating them in the context of unity’. They make the particular observation that 
‘while the issue of reconciling social justice with environmental protection has 
surfaced at every major international meeting since the first environment and 
development conference in 1972’ (2007:2), there is little evidence that this has ever 
really been adopted at anything other than a rhetorical level and that the significance 
of global economic asymmetries have never been addressed as a part of this process.  
Timmons Roberts and Parks make the point that, while there was originally a high 
degree of optimism that the advent of the UNFCCC would finally begin to see the 
principles of sustainable development – as outlined in the Brundtland Report – 
enshrined in a global climate pact, the lifetime of the UNFCCC process has done little 
to suggest that this has necessarily been the case. As they observe, while the Rio 
Declaration called upon the 187 signatories to ‘protect the climate system…on the 
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities’, 
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the original UNFCCC Treaty avoided the tough details regarding how this might 
work in practical terms and seemed to be reluctant to address some of the tough 
questions on the functioning of the current and historical global political economy 
which needed to be resolved.   
 
As a good case in point, they point to failed promises from developed countries to 
take the lead on financial responsibility and technology transfer – in alignment with 
acknowledged capacities to do so within the framework of the UNFCCC.  As they 
point out: ‘before the ink had even dried on the UNFCCC agreement, rich nations 
began to backpedal on their promise of massive technology transfer and technical 
assistance to the developing world. The estimated price tag for sustainable 
development in the Third World was $625 billion a year, with the North supplying 
about 20 per cent of the total cost in grants or below market rate loans.  However, the 
rich nations delivered less than one-fifth of that promise (Timmons Roberts and Park, 
2007:3). They point out that these things serve to demonstrate the importance of 
being able to identify the asymmetric power relationships that underpin the world 
capitalist system – unequal relationships which are currently reflected back in the 
functioning of the UNFCCC. 
 
Timmons Roberts and Parks suggest that three particular insights illustrate that the 
UNFCCC reflects the political and economic inequalities of the world capitalist 
system as a ‘problem structure’ regarding its effectiveness in negotiating the 
possibilities for a global low-carbon future.  Firstly, they argue that:  
 
The UNFCCC itself serves to highlight issues of trust, worldviews, causal 
beliefs and principled beliefs which are largely attributable to the position of 
countries in the global division of labour.  Inequality dampens utility- 
enhancing cooperative efforts by reinforcing structuralist worldviews and 
causal beliefs, creating incentives for zero-sum and negative-sum behaviour, 
polarizing preferences, generating divergent and unstable expectations about 
future behaviour, eroding trust and civic norms among different social 
groups, destabilizing policy coalitions, and making it difficult to coalesce 
round a socially shared understanding of what is “fair” (Timmons Roberts 
and Parks, 2009:6).      
 
According to Timmons Roberts and Parks, the second and related problem which 
arises through the UNFCCC process as it currently stands, relates to the ongoing 
development crisis, such as ongoing debates over the definition of sustainable 
development, foreign assistance on environmental matters, and global versus local 
concerns.  They point out that negotiations around climate change are currently 
taking place during a period of time ‘when concerns over Northern callousness and 
opportunism in matters of international political economy are rising, levels of 
generalized trust are declining, and calls for fair processes and fair outcomes are 
being marginalized’ (2007:6).  Accordingly, as Agarwal et al (1999) suggest, debates 
on how to address climate change at the global level cannot be divorced from their 
framing within the nature of global systemic inequalities.   
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Significantly, Timmons Roberts and Parks point out that that the West has largely 
ignored or backtracked on many of the local environmental problems which have 
arisen in developing nations during the last thirty years or more, namely: ‘the 
provision of safe drinking water, slowing soil erosion, treating sewage, slowing the 
spread of deserts, and reducing air pollution’ (2007:6).  They suggest that this 
situation has occurred primarily due to a primary need to ensure what Wallerstein 
has described as the core-periphery economic and political relationship between 
developed and developing countries.  Consequently, Connolly (1996) suggests that 
the rising urgency of global commons issues in more recent years, such as ozone 
depletion, habitat loss, but particularly climate change, has put developed countries 
in the problematic political position of trying to persuade many developing countries 
to take action on environmental issues which may not be within their immediate 
priority.  
 
Finally, Timmons Roberts and Park point out that the above issues now serve to 
layer more political issues onto the difficulties of what is already a complex issue.  
Explanations that are more specific to the ‘problem structure’ of the climate change 
debate include:  
 the number of parties needed to resolve the problem; 
 the complexity of the problem; 
 the time sensitivity of the solution; 
 the quantity and quality of the information; 
 the high levels of uncertainty surrounding the issue; 
 the stability and intensity of actor preferences; 
 the “observability” of climate related behaviour; 
 the asymmetry of externalities (Timmons Roberts and Parks, 2007:7). 
 
 
5.  The political timeline of the UNFCCC process 1992 – 2010: what has been 
agreed and why  
Timmons Roberts and Parks suggest that all of the above issues revolve around the 
political resolution of three key areas related to responsibility, vulnerability and 
mitigation. They suggest that more in-depth insight must take these ‘triple 
inequalities’ as the starting point to a better understanding as to why countries might 
be either willing or unwilling to cooperate through the framework of the UNFCCC. 
 
The next section of the document seeks to add fresh insights to some of the 
conceptual observations which were made in the first part of the document 
regarding why the UNFCCC process has been problematic in achieving its aims.  The 
stakeholder interviews which were carried out for this purpose were conducted 
during and subsequent to COP-15. As the first part of the document has argued, as 
the science of climate change becomes more urgent, and the need to act becomes 
more pressing, it has become more apparent that barriers to the political will to act 
remain rooted in the legacies of a historical (world) system, ‘whose structures 
operate at a different level than any existing political unit’ (Griffiths, 2010:342).   
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This section of the document therefore attempts to go further than the literature 
section in adding observation and commentaries on the argument that the UNFCCC 
as a political platform itself serves to reflect issues of trust, worldviews, causal beliefs 
and principled beliefs which are largely attributable to the position of countries in 
the global division of labour.  What then are the viewpoints of those who have been 
involved in the process and how have they seen the historical evolution of the 
UNFCCC? What are the differing positions? How are these historical structures 
perceived by different stakeholders? Is there a way forward for the UNFCCC process 
at a political level and how might this come about? The section pays particular 
attention to the different COP meetings which have informed the UNFCCC process, 
exploring through interviews with the stakeholders who have been involved in this 
process, the kinds of structures which might have influenced the particular outcomes 
along the way. 
 
5.1 Drawing the lines for a post-Rio Politics 
As already discussed, the ongoing development of the UNFCCC is decided and 
implemented through annual meetings of what is known as The Conference of the 
Parties (COP).  The ways in which the issues outlined above feed into the political 
nature of the UNFCCC has meant that reaching effective global agreement on climate 
change was always going to revolve around establishing incremental, long-term 
progress.  The first of these meetings took place in Berlin in the spring of 1995.  The 
discussions which took place around COP-1, or what became know as ‘the Berlin 
Mandate’ were therefore informed by a commitment to establishing an initial 2-year 
Analytical and Assessment Phase (AAP) for the Treaty.  Fundamentally, this entailed 
fleshing out the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ aims and objectives that 
had been agreed as the guiding framework for the structure of the UNFCCC.  Thus 
the aims of COP 1 were to start the process of agreement regarding the policies or 
‘menu of actions’ through which the diverse range of signatories would be begin to 
be able to take action in addressing climate change.   
 
As Grubb et al (1999:47) argue, ‘the political pressures to reach some kind of enabling 
agreement intensified in the run up to Berlin and at the conference itself’.  While the 
aftermath of the Rio Earth Summit had seen a degree of scepticism re-emerge into the 
debate – chiefly in the US – the growing consensus on the science of climate change 
was coupled with an awareness that the Annex I signatories were patently not on 
track to reduce their current emissions trajectories to 1990 levels.  Negotiating an 
effective policy framework faced further difficulties when it became apparent that 
direct taxation on carbon was patently not a realistic option given that developed 
countries were keen that the market should take the lead in any policies which were 
to be developed. Proposals to introduce this form of regulatory device had been 
successfully challenged – Clinton’s Btu Tax in the US and moves to initiate a 
European Carbon Tax in the EU in the early 90s – so it was now apparent that the 
policy mechanisms through which the UNFCCC would operate would take on a 
different form from direct regulation.   
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5.2 The environmental reshaping of the G77 
Subsequent to the Rio negotiations, the way in which national positions might begin 
to form according to Wallerstein’s idea of the ‘capitalist world system’, started to 
become apparent prior to the first COP meeting.   While, as Karlsson et al (2008:2) 
point out, the formation of the G77 group of developing countries began to take 
shape during the 1960s, there is no doubt that the climate change debate saw its 
reconfiguration in response to economic and political stakes which can be traced to 
historical power imbalances between East and West and the emergence of what 
George W. Bush described as ‘the rise of new world order’.  As Karlsson et al argue 
(2008), the G77 came together originally as a result of the fragmentation of colonial 
links; the advent of the global political and economic hegemony of the United States; 
and the East/West Cold War divide: 
 
Optimism about the future [post-colonial] was not matched by the type of 
cooperation from the rich countries that would enable the developing 
countries to live up to their aspirations for progress.  If anything, the 
Southern countries found themselves facing a situation of worsening terms of 
trade in relation with industrial countries whereby more and more of the 
South’s raw materials and agricultural products were needed to purchase 
fewer and fewer of the North’s manufactured products. This had the effect of 
coercing countries into political alliances that went counter to their long-term 
interests (Karlsson et al, 2008:2) 
 
Wallerstein (1974) has argued that the dissolution of colonialism has seen the rise of 
what he terms a ‘core-periphery’ relationship between the North and the South.  
Indeed Karlsson et al (2008) make the case that the new financial architecture that 
accompanied the introduction of the Bretton Woods system vis a vis the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, helped to institutionalize a continuation of the 
unequal global power relations that were already in existence; encouraging a more 
coordinated, political response from the developing countries of the South.  The 1964 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development signified the beginning of 
this collaboration and the G77 now boasts the collaboration of 130 developing 
counties plus China as an ‘associate member’ (Karlsson et al, 2008:2).  The 
overarching umbrella of the G77 itself can be identified by this North-South divide 
whilst being characterized by three distinct groups: the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC); the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS); and the rest 
of the developing countries comprising Africa, Latin America, China, India, Brazil 
and Indonesia.  The collective has no policy making status but its primary purpose is 
to provide international representation of the range of views from developing 
countries which may otherwise have been marginalized within the conditions 
outlined at the beginning of this section.   
 
Karlsson et al have argued that the decision making structure characterizing the G77 
constitutes its strengths, but also its weaknesses.  The ‘strength in numbers’ 
bargaining approach of the G77 gives it greater political muscle than its constituent 
parts would be able to offer – and an effective counterpoint to the economic and 
political infrastructures that have been assembled by the developed nations of the 
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North.  However, Karlsson et al suggest that the ‘consensus as decision-making’ 
ethos that is characteristic of the G77 decision-making process does not necessarily fit 
well with incorporating the range of different issues that exist within the collective.  
It is often the case that the power relations that exist within the G77 become 
apparent, where reaching democratic consensus is often hard to achieve.   
 
The issue of climate change has thrown the activities of the G77 much more directly 
into the spotlight in recent times, particularly in regard to political tensions around 
the ‘sustainability gap’ between the North and the South.  As Grubb et al point out, 
this was the first real indication that the countries of the G77 were prepared to take 
the science of climate change seriously, but within the proviso that the financial 
responsibility would be taken by the developed countries through the historical 
legacy of development.  As argued above, while the North-South political identity 
provides an overarching framework for the collective interests of the G77, the issue 
of climate change is also ironic in that it graphically illustrates points of diversity 
amongst its membership, particularly at the point of different perceptions of national 
self-interest.  As Karlsson et al (2008:5) point out: ‘within the South we find the 
regions and countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, countries 
that not only see it as a threat to their development priorities but a threat to their 
very existence.  At the other extreme we find those countries whose whole economies 
rest on activities which literally fuel climate change’.  Thus it has been the case on 
numerous occasions that the interests within the G77 have very often contradicted 
each other and have ultimately served to weaken the bargaining power of the 
coalition itself. 
 
From the beginning of the UNFCCC, the G77 negotiated largely as a political bloc in 
order to try to gain an effective foothold on the above issues.  China has always 
preferred to maintain a degree of autonomy in these negations, which is reflected in 
its status as an ‘associate member’.  Whilst consensus was fairly easily reached 
regarding the political position of the G77 on what they collectively argued to be the 
responsibilities which should be assumed by the developed world for the political 
and economic implications development and present patterns of per capita emissions.  
Williams (2005:62) argues that the divisions within the G77 can be summarized as: 
the differential stages of economic development which exist within the grouping; 
varied access to energy sources; and different levels of vulnerability to the 
consequences of climate change.  As he points out: ‘in entering the negotiating 
process, these different interests intermittently weaken the G77’s joint bargaining 
position.   
 
5.3 COP 1 and COP II: setting out the political landscape of the UNFCCC 
As well as greater cohesiveness within the G77 in preparation for the beginning of 
the UNFCCC process, the COP I negotiations were also significant in that they 
witnessed a firming up on the commitment from the EU as an umbrella political 
grouping: a position that was further cemented as the only OECD group that had 
managed to stabilize its emissions since 1990 (Grubb et al, 1999).   Early negotiations 
saw the EU push specifically for binding commitments for countries to reduce their 
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emissions to below 1990 levels to be written into the treaty alongside specified 
targets and agreed timeframes which could be worked within. 
 
However, early COP 1 negotiations signposted signs of the trouble which lay ahead 
when the chief objection to this recommendation came from the United States, who 
argued that future emission projections showed that the newly industrializing 
nations would collectively become the highest global polluters during the next two 
decades with no current sanctions in place to dissuade this.   It was clear at this stage 
that the United States – and others in the JUSSCANNZ group such as Japan, Canada 
and Australia – expected progress to be made in engaging developing countries in 
setting any future commitments concerning reduction targets on emissions. 
 
The frustration of this impasse for the countries which were most at risk from the 
effects of climate change was expressed by Atiq Rahman of the Bangladesh Centre 
for Advanced Studies.  As Timmons Roberts and Parks (2007:2) point out: ‘in the 
decade leading up to the 1995 conference, Bangladesh had been struck by two 
devastating floods and two typhoons that left over a hundred thousand people dead 
and tens of thousands of people homeless’.  ‘If climate change makes our country 
uninhabitable’, Rahman, warned the developed country representatives, ‘we will 
march with our wet feet into your living rooms’ (Rahman, quoted in Athanasiou and 
Baer, 2002:23).  
 
An NGO representative, who was interviewed for this study, suggests that there was 
initially a large measure of goodwill during the early COP meetings and a suggested 
willingness from developed countries to take the lead on climate change and, more 
importantly, to acknowledge the equity issues around development, financial 
capability and historical responsibility.  He remained skeptical, however, in regard to 
whether this impetus has been maintained through the UNFCCC process:  
Certainly, the science of climate change was quite clear then.  So that 
grounding of goodwill and international cooperation on environment and 
development, and considering climate change as part of larger structural 
development issues facing the majority of the world, you know, that was the 
basis of the Convention, and I think, since then, we saw through to Kyoto, 
very little action from countries who had taken on that historical 
responsibility and commitment to undertake actions based on their capability 
as well (UK NGO representative).  
 
The second UNFCCC Conference of Parties meeting, held in Geneva, Switzerland in 
July 1996, which was characterized mainly by a strongly worded position statement 
by the US Under Secretary for Global Affairs for the US State Department.  Designed 
primarily to refute accusations that the US were not committed to reaching 
agreement on an effective global climate change deal, Wirth suggested a package of 
policy measures which would encourage progress towards more a more concrete set 
of actions amongst UNFCCC signatories.  After confirming US support in regard to 
the the findings and recommendations of the IPCCs Second Assessment Report from 
the previous year, Wirth observed: 
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Our analysis and consideration of the issue to date have led us to certain 
conclusions…sound policies pursued in the near term will allow us to avoid 
the prospect of truly draconian and economically disruptive policies in the 
future…denial and delay will only make our economies vulnerable in the 
future.  The US will seek market-based solutions that are flexible and cost-
effective…the US recommends that future negotiations focus on an 
agreement that sets a realistic, verifiable and binding medium term emissions 
target…met through maximum flexibility in the selection of implementation 
measures, including the use of reliable activities implemented jointly, and 
trading mechanisms around the world (Wirth, 1996.  Cited in Grubb et al, 
1999:54). 
 
As Grubb et al (1999:54) have argued, this was a significant development in the 
UNFCCC negotiations as it was the first time that there had been an official 
statement made regarding a call for quantified commitments on emission reductions 
to be put in place.  It was also a call for consensus within a complex US stance 
characterized by a federal political system which was now being lobbied heavily by 
industry and commerce over what the terms of a climate deal would involve for 
sectors such as the oil and coal industry.  These terms were also heavily backed by 
the EU, anxious to play an early diplomacy card in proceedings.  Of the other Annex 
I countries, Japan remained cautious during this early period of negotiations as it 
was wary of commiting to further efficiency measures and Russia and Australia were 
strongly opposed to the US recommendations. 
 
COP II was also notable for the first real signs of political tension within the G77.  
The diversity of interests has often shaped an uneasy alliance within the G77 and it 
came noticeably under strain at the Berlin COP II meeting where there was concern 
amongst the OPEC nations that an ‘unfair’ global climate policy agreement would 
ultimately hurt profits from global oil exports and reduce income.  This agenda came 
into obvious conflict with the quite different interests that were being sought from 
many of the other members of the G77. While the members of OPEC – 13 members – 
were wary of possible challenges to their own national resource assets which could 
come from too much regulation from the UNFCCC, this came into obvious conflict 
with the more ‘climate vulnerable’ members. The members of OPEC have been quite 
happy to comply with the absence of emission reduction targets even though this 
may come into conflict with the physical consequences of this for the more 
vulnerable regions.  
 
The members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) for instance were 
concerned with sea-level rises that were predicted by business-as-usual scenarios. 
Significantly, Larson (2005) points out that climate change was a central organizing 
issue around the formation of AOSIS and its forty three strong membership.  Africa 
was keen to makes sure that the consequences of predicted desertification issues 
were addressed and that expected rises in poverty such as in Bangladesh or the East 
African states were acknowledged as being integral to future UNFCCC policy 
actions. Hampson and Hart (1995) point out that the Latin American members of the 
G77 placed emphasis on the need for mitigation. 
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6. COP 3: agreeing the Kyoto Protocol 
The legal framework of the UNFCCC was given a more extensive policy status 
through the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 where, the key questions which negotiators 
attempted to answer were:   
 
• What would a consensual global international climate deal look like and how 
would it work? 
• What would be the key milestones and how could progress be measured? 
• How could diverse economic and political conditions be utilized in order to drive 
agreement?  
• How could the policies which would come out of Kyoto integrate equity issues 
on development with more stringent targeting and mitigation? 
• What were the institutional cornerstones for international cooperation and 
leadership on medium and longer-term action on climate change? 
• How could the rising emissions of developing countries be addressed without 
compromising their ability to expand their economies?   
• How could responsibility for carbon emissions be shared between producers and 
consumers of goods? 
 
As of January 2008, 182 countries have ratified the requirements that were agreed in 
the Kyoto Protocol, where the significance of COP 3 in the move towards an effective 
global, low-carbon economy agreement has been pointed out by Grubb et al who 
suggest that: 
 
The Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
represents a pinnacle of trends towards globalization in economic and 
environmental policy, and defines the basic structural elements upon which 
global efforts to tackle climate change in the twenty-first century will rest 
(Grubb et al, 1999: xxxiii). 
 
In their comprehensive study of the influential structure which was implemented 
from the time of the Kyoto Protocol, Grubb et al (1999) argued that the treaty that was 
set in motion in 1997 was shaped by three particular concerns leading on from the 
first two COP meetings: 
 
• Policies and measures.  Subsequent to the Berlin Mandate, the EU were particularly 
influential in pushing for agreement on the types of policies and measures which 
could now be put in place by Parties to meet the objectives which had been 
agreed within the UNFCCC.  As the section will argue, the EU originally pushed 
for more regulatory measures in opposition to a US preference for trading 
mechanisms; 
• Quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives.  Following on from the Berlin 
Mandate, the Kyoto negotiations were structured by three concerns over 
emission targets and reductions: the scope of commitments (the time-scale and 
coverage of sources and sinks); the level of commitments to be adopted , 
including whether and how they should be differentiated between parties; and 
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the international mechanisms by which flexibility might be introduced into national 
obligations; 
• Developing country concerns and participation.  The Berlin Mandate had precluded 
the adoption of new commitments by developing countries.  However, a 
commitment to ‘continue to advance the existing commitments’ of developing 
countries was but one of several dimensions of debate concerning their role and 
needs, including issues relating to technology transfer and finance (Grubb et al, 
1999:62). 
 
As argued above, the significance of the Kyoto Protocol was that it extended the 
original aims of the UNFCCC in regard to either assigning specific obligatory 
emissions cuts to signatories in the Annex I and Annex II countries or enforcing more 
stringent monitoring and auditing requirements of those classified in the developing 
countries.  As Walker and King (2008:180) observe, ‘in total, the Protocol was 
designed to cut global emissions by 5 per cent of their 1990 levels by 2012.  Though 
this was far too low to make a significant difference to the problem, it was always 
intended to be a first step, after which the levels would be ratcheted upwards’.   In 
keeping with ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’,  India, China and the 
other developing countries were not required to make mandatory emissions cuts.  
Instead, in an attempt to reflect the concerns of developed signatories concerning 
rising emissions in the South, the UNFCCC required that more quantifiable 
commitments would take the form of extensive auditing and reporting of levels of 
pollution, alongside domestic mechanisms that were being implemented to address 
them.  Social and development goals were acknowledged by the framework of the 
UNFCCC as being more important than climate change policies per se at this stage.  
 
As argued above, an important development at Kyoto was it now introduced 
specified emissions reduction targets.  This was an important stage to reach as the 
aims of the UNFCCC would have meant nothing without any such actions to back 
claims that were being made for the long-term effectiveness of the proposed policy 
framework.  During Kyoto, thirty-two countries agreed to reduce, increase, or 
stabilize the level of GHGs they emitted for the period 2008-2012 according to 1990 
baseline measures.  Indeed, the emphasis on ‘stabilizing’ emissions that has informed 
the aims of the UNFCCC from the beginning can be illustrated in the tables below, 
whereby these targets have been made flexible in order to account for the particular 
circumstances characterizing signatories baseline issues at this time.   
 
Countries who agreed to reduce their emissions at Kyoto: 
 
               Country  Reduction in emissions of greenhouse 
gases 
21 member states of the European Union                8% reduction  
5 countries in Europe (not member states 
of the European Union) 
               8% reduction                
United States                   7% reduction  
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland                6% reduction  
Croatia                  5% reduction  
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Countries that were permitted to increase their emissions during the Kyoto 
negotiations: 
 
                 Country  Increase in emissions of greenhouse gases 
Norway  1% increase allowed 
Australia  8% increase is allowed 
Iceland  10% increase is allowed 
 
 
Countries that were allowed to maintain their levels of greenhouse gas emissions: 
 
             Country   
New Zealand  Able to maintain level of emissions  
Russian Federation  Able to maintain level of emissions  
Ukraine  Able to maintain level of emissions  
 
 
As argued above, under the terms of the UNFCCC, developing countries were 
excluded from specific targets and are not in fact mentioned in the protocol itself.  
With the benefit of hindsight, this UK NGO representative suggests that it is possible 
to see the political maneuverings during COP III around the developed nations 
beginning to exert their political influence on how proceedings would now develop.  
He suggests, for instance, that while the US was keen to come on board within a 
policy framework which emphasized the opportunities which might be provided 
within a global market framework, the global equity issues which had formed the 
basis of initial negotiations where now in danger of backsliding:  
 
As I understand it, in the formulation of the Kyoto Protocol, with respect to 
the flexible mechanisms and carbon trading coming in and so forth, and the 
[clean] development mechanism – which of course started as a proposal by 
Brazil for a clean development fund and not an offsetting mechanism at all – 
was to try and get the US agreement, which they did agree, and then 
subsequently didn’t ratify.  Moving forward from then, I think we’ve seen an 
increased politicization, and very little progress, from my understanding.  If 
you look at the discussions and the decision texts from…since Kyoto on the 
issues like technology transfer, on issues like adaptation, there’s been such 
little progress between Kyoto and now (UK NGO representative). 
   
 
6.1 China: reconciling development and the environment? 
While it was considered crucial from the start of the UNFCCC to integrate the 
developing countries in a ‘progressive’ global climate change agreement which 
might work towards eventual mitigation, the changing position of China over the 
last two decades has served to illustrate the particular complexities of reaching such 
a stage through the UNFCCC political process.  Similar to other developing country 
negotiating positions, China’s principal bargaining status during the opening 
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negotiations around the framework of UNFCCC, was based upon the claim that the 
primacy of economic development and associated social and political goals must 
come prior to any commitment to setting caps on indigenous emissions.  As a part of 
the rhetoric characterizing the claims of the G77 in negotiations over the structure of 
the UNFCCC, China was particularly vociferous in arguing that environmental 
objectives are inextricably linked into global development debates. China has 
therefore maintained a subsequent position that any treaty agreements must be 
based upon a greater measure of responsibility in the actions of the developed world 
in accounting for both historical and current per capita emission levels.   
 
From the outset of discussions around the UNFCCC, there was agreement that 
China’s participation would involve an emphasis on the transfer of technology from 
Annex I nations through which to aid ‘cleaner’ economic growth rather than to cap 
emissions per se.  However, China’s participation within this particular framing of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ continues to be a point of contention in 
the political debate over signatories’ responsibilities to working towards a global, 
low carbon future. The United States in particular, have continued to argue that they 
will not ratify Kyoto unless China agrees to the same conditions as the developed 
countries.  As this interviewee from a Canadian NGO argued, in both economic and 
political terms, the position of a few developing countries has changed since the 
beginning of the UNFCCC, suggesting that there is now a growing dilemma around 
whether there now might also be room for a change in their original responsibilities: 
 
The large developing economies…China, India, Brazil…their influence has 
grown exponentially because of…you know, their emissions are going up 
(Canadian NGO interviewee)  
 
China’s development over the last two decades has been one of the more impressive 
economic models when measured in terms of growth.  The reform policies that have 
been put in place since the late 70s have seen the country gradually embrace market 
principles and economic growth over state socialism.  ZhiDong (2003:1) points out 
that growth during this period can be measured at almost 10 % per annum where in 
terms of GDP it currently lies sixth in the world.  ZhiDong suggests that it will be 
very difficult for China to maintain this rate of growth indefinitely but argues 
anyhow that this path to progress has so far been at the expense of the environment; 
health issues in the population; and also looming energy security problems.   Coal 
remains the largest form of energy consumption – fueling a largely industrial base – 
and is both a direct contributor to China’s impressive record of economic growth but 
also to its position as the world’s number one greenhouse gas emitter where it 
recently overtook the United States.  Signaling the extent of this problem, Walker and 
King (2008) point out that China is currently building a coal-fired power station at an 
average of one a week: a fundamental factor to be considered in tracking the growth 
of China’s CO2 emissions during the last twenty years by 2.1 times.  China’s share in 
the world’s total emissions has risen from 8.2 per cent to 13.7 per cent (ZhiDong, 
2003:3).   
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The United States have argued that this gives further credence to their refusal to sign 
up the Kyoto Protocol.  Others however, suggest that much of China’s rising 
economic performance is powered by growth in the export sector – much of which is 
itself fueled by demand from the West (New Economics Foundation, 2007).  Walker 
and King have made the point that many developed countries have invariably 
dodged out of responsibility of their own indigenous carbon dioxide emissions in 
this way by exporting them to developing countries with less stringent 
environmental regulations. 
 
China’s rate of economic growth has also put it in competition for global energy 
supplies as it gradually becomes a net importer, primarily to meet rising oil demand.  
China was previously self sufficient in oil during the 1960s and a net exporter during 
the 1980s.  However, dwindling stocks now mean that China is the world’s seventh 
largest importer of oil, fueled in part by a rising population and associated standards 
of living (ZhiDong, 2003).   
 
The Chinese Government’s biggest priority remains at present the massive disparity 
in wealth that currently exists, with 700 million Chinese citizens currently living on 
less than 2 dollars per day.    However, as Walker and King (2008:200) argue: ‘unless 
China finds a way to develop without massively increasing its greenhouse gas 
emissions, the efforts of the rest of the world in addressing climate change will count 
for very little’.  At the moment therefore, while China has ratified Kyoto, addressing 
its own domestic energy needs have been seen as a greater priority than actually 
developing policies to cut indigenous emissions.  This debate continues to structure 
much of the political debate on how the UNFCCC framework should be structured, 
with the most obvious example of this being the United States continuing refusal to 
ratify Kyoto while China is not subject to emission reduction targets.  As this Chinese 
Government delegate interviewed during the COP 15 negotiations argued: 
 
At the moment, politics is local, but climate change is global. This has meant a 
situation based on conflict so far. For example, the rest of world can do 
nothing when the senate of the U.S. doesn’t approve the bill.  The major 
obstacles to achieving equity in this are: (i) there is no objective benchmark in 
measuring each country’s responsibility. The developed countries argued that 
80% cut is deep enough given the global target they proposed is 50% in 2050, 
but the developing countries don’t necessarily think so. So we need an 
objective criterion.  (ii) as indicated above, the conflict between the local 
politics and global issues remains a major barrier (interview with Chinese 
Government delegate).  
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7. COP 4 and COP 5: negotiating Kyoto ratification  
 
Definitely ’97…COP 3 was a milestone in the UNFCCC process.  For the first 
time ever, developed countries agreed to mitigate.  That was a major 
milestone.  After that of course, people now know that it’s not necessarily 
easy to mitigate further (Japanese delegate interviewee). 
 
As Grubb et al (1999:248) have argued, ‘the Kyoto Protocol, together with the Climate 
Change Convention on which it rests, represented the culmination of nine years of 
learning and institution building, both domestically and internationally, following 
the establishment of the IPCC in 1988’.  Both COP-4 and COP-5 were primarily based 
around trying to refine the details or ‘deal with Kyoto’s unfinished business’ on how 
the policies agreed during would now be incorporated into the future framework of 
the UNFCCC.  While it had been expected that the remaining issues from COP-3 
would be agreed upon during the Buenos Aires discussions, the complexity and 
difficulties of finding agreement on these issues meant instead that signatories would 
now adopt a 2-year ‘plan of action’, in order to advance the efforts that had been 
made during the Kyoto discussions.   
Particular issues to be addressed during this two-year time period included: 
 
• The financial mechanisms through which the Kyoto Protocol would be activated; 
• The channels through which the development and transfer of technologies would 
take place; 
• How the specific needs and concerns of developing countries might be addressed 
post-Kyoto; 
• Reaching agreement on how the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol would 
operated within the parameters of the UNFCCC; 
• Preparations for the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as 
meetings of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (Grubb et al, 1999:249). 
 
Timmons Roberts and Parks (2007) have argued that the stakes between developed 
and developing countries in the UNFCCC process ‘could be seen in the conflict 
between the approach taken in the Kyoto Treaty, which took the politically expedient 
approach of granting rights to pollute, based on 1990 levels of emissions’ as opposed 
to the per capita approach which had been proposed by poor nations, ‘in which each 
person on earth is given an equal share of emissions’ (Timmons Roberts and Parks, 
2007:21).  In this way, both COP 4 and COP 5 witnessed further discussions around 
developing country concerns on the viability of carbon trading as the figurehead 
policy of UNFCCC action.   
 
7.1 The Kyoto instruments: trading emissions through a market-led approach 
While the three main policies agreed at Kyoto were designed around the principles 
of a system of ‘carbon trading’, details remained to be ironed out, principally around 
how this would work in an equitable sense, particularly in regard to the principles 
around sustainable development which had formed much of the dialogue around the 
original UNFCCC treaty.  One of the ways in which it was hoped that this policy 
design would encourage this aim was through the development of a number of 
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‘flexibility mechanisms’, which would theoretically be responsive to the complexities 
of the differential needs of UNFCCC signatories.  The policy design of carbon trading 
was originally drawn from the sulphur dioxide trading scheme which has run in the 
United States from 1990 under the US Government’s Acid Rain Programme.  As 
Lockwood (2007:48) points out, this programme had been developed as a way 
though which to address the problem of rising sulphur emissions across the US 
through the creation of a ‘market for pollution’.   
 
By placing a US Government imposed mandatory cap on the 400 sulphur emitting 
power plants that were included in the scheme, companies then operated within an 
internal system of ‘pollution trading’ whereby those who had difficulties in reaching 
emission levels that had been agreed prior to the programme could then buy permits 
from those who had been able to reach their own agreed sulphur reduction targets 
more easily.  The US were particularly keen to see such a design – rather than more 
direct regulatory measures – arguing that the benefits of such a programme were 
that the costs of addressing climate change would occur on a least-cost basis, 
avoiding the political controversy of direct regulation and taxation.  As Lockwood 
points out, the success of the sulphur trading scheme in the US could be gauged by 
the fact that ‘emissions in the first five years fell by fifty per cent, more than the cap 
required.  It was also estimated that the programme has saved $3bn compared to the 
costs of alternative sulphur dioxide reduction schemes’ (Lockwood, 2007:48).     
 
As Lockwood has observed, it was the success of this programme that convinced the 
Kyoto negotiators that a similar scheme was worth a try as a way in which to address 
some of the more difficult economic issues which might beset Annex 1 signatories in 
reducing their emissions in alignment with pollution targets.  The US were 
particularly concerned that more direct regulation would affect the global 
competitiveness of the more direct energy users, who would clearly be targeted for 
the initial GHG reductions.  The appeal of carbon trading as a basis from which to 
progress from Kyoto therefore lay in the fact that, while the agreed policy framework 
was aimed at reducing emissions, it would also enable the major emitters such as 
‘electricity producers and energy intensive industrial sectors, such as iron, steel, 
cement, basic chemicals’ (Albrecht, 2002:2) the time and the flexibility to re-channel 
their business-as-usual environmental practices through a market-based framework.     
 
8. The European Union and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
In recent times, European integration has become particularly pertinent in regard to 
the search for a more unified global response to contemporary environmental 
concerns.  The European Union’s development as an active player and instigator in 
the dynamics of environmental standard setting at an international level has enabled 
it to make a more observable contribution to the environmental debate at a global 
level, where as Grubb et al (1999) point out, ‘the EU has been at the forefront of 
pressure for stronger action on climate change’.  As this interviewee argued, the 
political will provided by a coherent EU position was particularly important during 
subsequent to the Kyoto discussions, where he argues that it was: 
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The EU’s activism that got us to the level of ambition…sort of driven by some 
of the more activist…the more ambitious member states, but certainly the EU.  
The EU led many of the technical suggestions [of Kyoto] in terms of 
financing, in terms of the structure of the agreement (UK Government 
interviewee) 
 
Cass (2005:38) points out that the EU was initially reluctant to ‘incorporate 
international emissions trading into the Kyoto Protocol, posing the argument that 
measures which were designed to reduce domestic emissions had to be the primary 
policy responses to climate change’. Cass suggests that the principle reason that the 
EU came on board with emissions trading as the preferred design for the Kyoto 
policy framework had more to do with an acknowledgement that it would be ‘part of 
the price for securing American participation in the Kyoto Protocol’ (Cass, 2005:38).  
However, this position subsequently changed where, as Cass observes, the EU 
became ‘more convinced of the potential for emissions trading as a tool to more 
efficiently reduce European emissions, and they gradually accepted that 
international emissions trading could play a legitimate role in achieving Kyoto’s 
emission reduction targets’ (Cass, 2005:39).   
 
Cass argues that two factors influenced this shift in the normative dispute over 
policy direction.  Firstly, there was a gradual acceptance by the EU member states of 
the US position on the cost effectiveness of a carbon market over the EU’s preferred 
alternatives of implementing carbon taxes and domestic regulatory changes in order 
to achieve the aims and objectives of Kyoto.  The proposition that the Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation would form the two ‘flexibility 
mechanisms’ also gave credence to the idea that it was not the location of emission 
cuts that was important, rather that they should be reduced in the most cost effective 
way.  Secondly, Cass argues that the EU was able to integrate this new normative 
perspective within a new political position ‘without losing credibility and legitimacy 
with the European public, NGOs, and its negotiating partners’, when the US 
withdrew from Kyoto ratification, more of which will be outlined in the next section.  
Cass reasons that the EU was then willing to move into move into the political void 
left by the US, and was able to play a more innovative – and also influential role 
within the political framework of the UNFCCC – in the development of the Kyoto 
trading mechanisms’ (Cass, 2005:40).   
 
Post 2000 therefore, the EU has played a leading role in the practical implementation 
of the agreed Kyoto policy instruments where.  In 2005, the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EES) became the first fully functioning, and largest multi-national carbon 
market in the world, covering emissions from over 10,000 installations in the energy 
and industrial sectors.  As Jones et al (2007:64) argue: ‘this represents around 40 per 
cent of total EU carbon emissions.  The scheme is intended to promote economic 
efficiency in implementing a given overall emissions reduction, by enabling 
participating firms to reduce their emissions at the lowest marginal abatement costs’.  
 
Others have been more skeptical in regard to the ‘success’ of the EU ETS, suggesting 
that, while the EU ETS remains at a relatively early stage of development, that it is 
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difficult to judge whether it has been a success or a failure, particularly in regard to 
its ability in reaching current and future EU targets on reducing levels of CO2 among 
its member states.  Critics of the first phase of the EU ETS, such as Lockwood (2007), 
have argued for instance that one of the main problems with the early design was 
that caps on emissions were originally set too low to effect real reductions in levels of 
CO2.  He points out that early lobbying by industry over the EU member state’s 
National Action Plans (NAPs) – in place to set the framework for the operation of the 
EU ETS – did much to ensure this through fear of implementation costs.  
Consequently, he suggests that in the first phase of the EU ETS – which ran from 
2005- 2007 – there was little incentive for firms to innovate and drive the long-term 
changes that would encourage an effective market in carbon reduction.  In relation to 
this, during the initial phase, there were also criticisms of over-generosity in permit 
allocation where firms made significant ‘windfall’ profits in permits with little 
environmental impact made.  As Reyes (2008:1) has argued, in the first phase of the 
EU ETS ‘more than 90% of the heavy industrial plants covered by the scheme emitted 
less than their quota of free credits.  Consequently, the market value of the credits 
collapsed, pollution continued apace, and the companies involved made billions in 
windfall profits by passing on imagined “costs” to consumers’.   
 
Ellerman et al (2007) point out that most of these ‘design flaws’ have subsequently 
been addressed, with allocations made scarcer through auctioning and caps on levels 
of pollution set more much more stringently for the second phase of the 2008-12 
phase of the EU ETS.  Criticism that the EU ETS will have only minimal impact due 
to the omission of shipping and air travel have also been addressed, where it is 
hoped that both of these major sources of emission will be included post-2012.  
However, others have been more vociferous in countering claims such as those made 
by Ellerman et al (2010) that the EU ETS has been an unmitigated success.  In a report 
for Friends of the Earth, Clifton (2009) argues that this is not necessarily the case and 
that the second phase of the EU ETS is set to repeat many of the same the failures of 
phase 1.    
Lohmann (2006:18) suggests that the EU made a wrong turn in deviating from its 
original aim to develop a policy framework which would have been based more 
around a regulatory regime.  It is significant, he suggests, that carbon trading itself 
serves to legitimate the continued use of fossil fuels in energy use while 
simultaneously endorsing a programme which enables the use of private 
corporations to legitimate ‘property rights over the world’s carbon absorbing 
capacity – encouraging the entrenchment of corporate power over carbon dumps.  As 
Balanya et al (2000) point out, the oil, automobile, mining and chemical industries 
were all active from the early 1990s in pushing for market-based solutions to climate 
change as opposed to more direct government regulation.  It has been suggested that 
this display of corporate power has been influential in subsuming the debate over 
introducing a carbon tax, the possibilities for more locally initiated energy 
distribution systems, and also the possibilities for moving government subsidies 
away from fossil fuel generation.    
 
Lohmann (2006) observes that the technological fix promised by carbon trading, can 
be viewed as an attempt to appease the longer-term aims of companies to continue to 
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make profits rather than a direct attempt to penalize the worst polluters.   As he has 
pointed out, while one of the arguments proposed by advocates of carbon trading 
was that similarly modeled policies augmented around ozone depletion and acid 
rain – both in the EU and in the US – is that they were particularly well suited to the 
technological fixes supplied by business and industry and were amenable to 
‘isolated’ policy aims.  Importantly however, as he suggests, unlike climate change: 
acid rain policy and initiatives that were put in place to address ozone pollution: 
‘didn’t require long-term restructuring of the energy sectors that are so central to 
industrialized economies’ (Lohmann, 2006:46). 
 
8.1 The Kyoto Flexibility mechanisms 
While carbon trading serves as the flagship policy to have been agreed at Kyoto, 
recognition of the diversity of interests which would need to be accommodated into 
a coherent and effective policy framework was given further recognition in the form 
of the ‘flexibility instruments’ and what Albrecht (2002:17) describes as ‘a category 
which comprises international emission permit trading, the Clean Development 
Mechanism and Joint Implementation’.  While the role of these instruments was to 
provide a degree of maneuverability for sectors in reaching their pollution targets, 
the flexibility instruments were also designed with the aim of integrating the 
developing country signatories into more fully into the long-term policy aims of the 
UNFCCC.   
 
The Clean Development Mechanism has also been criticized as the so-called 
‘flexibility mechanism’ through which to counteract the more orthodox market-based 
aims of carbon trading.  Both the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint 
Implementation are intended to in the way of being ‘redistribution policies’ in order 
to aid the transfer of investment and technology from the more prosperous Annex I 
countries in order to build capacity can be utilized to aid transitional economies to 
develop low carbon infrastructures. 
 
The WWF and Friends of the Earth have also suggested that the so-called ‘flexibility 
mechanisms’ that were agreed in the shape of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and the Joint Implementation Device are also designed as a way through 
which business and industry has been able to avoid direct government regulation 
regarding polluting activities and to pass on the cost of continuing with a business-
as-usual approach.  Bohringer and Finus (2005) argue that one of the main problems 
with the CDM for instance is that it is often difficult to gauge whether projects are 
likely to make any difference to emissions reductions that would have occurred 
without this participation.  They suggest the Kyoto monitoring mechanisms need 
extensive review in order to address this problem where commitment to this kind of 
reduction can often be viewed as too easy an option.   Henson (2006) goes further 
than this in arguing that in real terms, the CDM may simply be an instrument that 
serves to legitimize Annex I nations polluting legacy, encouraging them to simply 
buy their way out of any commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.   Again, 
the WWF argue that in order to direct global policy on climate change, CDM projects 
in the future must move away from subsidizing projects that in themselves 
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contribute either directly or indirectly to carbon emissions such as those involving 
coal, large-scale hydropower (Henson, 2006).  
 
9. COP 6 and 7: the US withdrawal from Kyoto 
As Fisher (2004:38) points out, while there were high hopes that the COP 6 round of 
talks would ‘conclude discussions of the text of the Kyoto Protocol and yield a 
ratifiable treaty, no such agreement was achieved’.  Fisher argues that there are 
divergent views as to why the Hague discussions failed (see Muller, 2000; Patterson, 
2001; Vrokijk, 2001), with some blaming the US position and others blaming the EU 
for the walkout which took place. 
 
The most controversial proposal at COP 6 came from the United States, who argued 
the case that the ‘carbon sinks’ in forest and agricultural land, and also nuclear 
energy, should now be included as mitigation credits.  These aims were strongly 
opposed by the EU in particular, where the general consensus held that agreeing to 
these proposals would lead to a heavily watered-down agreement over the policy 
trajectory for global climate change action – one which would in turn do little to 
address the urgency of the situation.  There was also disagreement over the sanctions 
that should be placed on countries which did not reach their designated targets; 
continued debate over what the ‘responsibilities’ should be for developing countries 
in the absence of specific reduction targets; and failure to reach agreement over the 
structures and procedures through which financial assistance could be utilized to aid 
developing countries in both de-carbonizing economic growth and adapting to the 
physical effects of climate change. 
 
Failure to reach agreement on the above issues led to collapse in the Hague 
discussions, prompting a reconvened meeting in July 2001 (COP 6bis).  The first blow 
to the reconvened COP-6 meeting occurred prior in March 2001 when the new Bush 
administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol and chose to participate at the Bonn 
meeting as observers and not participants.  Despite their input into its design, the US 
administration announced that they now considered the Kyoto Protocol to 
‘fundamentally flawed’ and announced that they were therefore unwilling to ratify 
the treaty.  The objections raised included what they now felt was the ‘uncertain 
science of climate change; that the protocol did not impose obligations on developing 
countries; and the fact it was felt that national implementation would be costly to the 
American economy’ (Hovi, 2003:1). While critics voiced their skepticism over the 
effectiveness of a Kyoto-driven UNFCCC process without the US on board, there was 
observable progress made on the above issues by the participants at the reconvened 
COP 6bis.  Amongst the main actions agreed upon in Bonn were: 
 
• The Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation were put together 
and given greater specification as the ‘flexibility mechanisms’ through which the 
industrialized countries would be able to fund emission reduction strategies in 
developing countries as a supplement to domestic emission reductions.  
• It was agreed that credits would also be awarded to signatories for broad 
activities that encourage absorption or carbon storage from the atmosphere or 
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store it, such as forest management and re-vegetation.  There was no overall cap 
imposed on signatory claims related to sink activities. 
• There was some discussion on potential sanctions to be imposed for signatories 
failing to comply with Protocol provisions and procedures.  While overall details 
were deferred to COP 7, preliminary proposals included the possibilities for 
signatories to ‘make up’ any shortfall in promised carbon reductions; the 
suspension of the right to sell credits in relation to surplus emissions; and revised 
action plans from signatories failing to meet agreed targets. 
• The reconvened COP 6 also saw some progress on the institutional mechanisms 
which would provide financial backup for the efficient implementation the Kyoto 
Protocol.  COP 6 saw agreement on the implementation of three new funds which 
would provide financial assistance for needs and requirements associated with 
climate change, with particular emphasis on financial support for developing 
country signatories.     
 
 
10. The United States: weighing up the economics of Kyoto  
The US decision to withdraw from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol under the Bush 
Administration in 2001 has served to confirm the continued difficulties in attaining 
political and economic consensus within the structure of the UNFCCC in establishing 
an effective climate change policy which would be truly global in reach.   
 
The US has been a truculent and often reluctant signatory to the UNFCCC process.  It 
is agreed however, that the need to get the US on board in any realistic strategy to 
reduce global carbon emissions cannot be ignored.  Vezirgiannidou (2008:40) 
confirms that the US rejection of Kyoto is a major blow to ‘the only international 
effort so far that has the potential organizing capacity of regulating the global 
greenhouse gas emissions’.  The US remains currently responsible for 25% of the 
world’s carbon emissions.  As Stiglitz (2006:171) reasons, a large part of the rationale 
behind the US refusal to go along with Kyoto is clear: engaging more directly in 
action on climate change ultimately places a potentially heavy burden on some of the 
most influential drivers of its own economy – particularly in relation to the heavy 
influence of the automobile, oil and coal industries.  Stiglitz suggests that a rigorous 
cost-benefit analysis of Kyoto resulted in a perception by the US administration that 
they would ultimately bearing the brunt of such costs under the terms of the treaty.  
 
As Howes (2005) has observed, it is significant that the failure of the US and Australia 
to ratify Kyoto during this period could also be linked to the fact that emissions per 
capita were increasing in both countries during this period.  As Howes suggests, 
many of the issues which began to emerge at Kyoto began to examine some of the 
assumptions underpinning the orthodox western model of development and some of 
the hard political choices that might potentially face, particularly the governments in 
Annex I countries, in addressing the central organizing forces of domestic demand.  
Vezirgiannidou (2008) confirms that the problems of integrating the US into the 
Kyoto Protocol further demonstrate the continuing difficulties that lay ahead in 
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reaching consensus on what a cohesive, internationally agreed climate change 
agreement should look like.   
 
Drawing from the international relations literature, Vezirgiannidou utilizes Grieco’s 
(1993) idea of relative gains theory in order to cast light on both the continuing US 
reluctance to participate in Kyoto, and also to speculate on why greater international 
consensus on climate change policy may continue to prove elusive in the future.  
Echoing Wallerstein’s conceptualization of the primacy of the world-system in 
explaining the behaviour of states in relationship to each other, Grieco utilizes 
relative gains theory in order to explore the relationship between national territories 
in an increasingly interconnected global economy.  He suggests that: ‘relative gains 
often impede cooperation because a state may believe that its partner(s) will gain 
more out of an international agreement, and then use the additional gains against the 
interests of the state in question’ (Vezirgiannidou, 2008:41).  The work of Waltz 
(1979:126) for example, has argued that the historical development of international 
policy has often served to illustrate how states very often assume the role of 
‘defensive positionalists’ rather than ‘utility maximizers’ – an assumption very often 
taken by traditional theorists of international relations – because very often ‘their 
ultimate goal is simply to maintain their position in the system’.  He reasons that this 
is particularly true with the growing significance of climate change in international 
policy development where:  
 
Treaties now invariably involve immediate costs in order to mitigate problems, 
but the benevolent effects of mitigation are only realizable in the future.  This 
means that future economic benefits from environmental abatement cannot 
be used to offset another’s present disproportionate gains (Vezirgiannidou, 
2008:43).   
 
Thus, utilizing this perspective, Vezirgiannidou argues that the construction of the 
Kyoto Protocol and subsequent political bartering that has taken place provides an 
interesting case in point where the growing saliency of the US-China relationship 
illustrates the way in which the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ ethos 
informing Kyoto resulted in a perceived relative gains problem for the US – and their 
economic relationship with China in particular – and, ultimately, a refusal to endorse 
ratification. Thus, while the US administration officially challenged the Kyoto 
Protocol on the basis of the authenticity of climate science, Balanya et al (2003) have 
argued that the economic case against Kyoto was made very early by the business 
lobby in the US. They argue that there was genuine concern over potential trade 
competitiveness issues that might occur between themselves and China over the 
weighting of responsibility for carbon mitigation.  As Vezirgiannidou has reasoned, 
as the science of climate change has become more convincing, the US 
administration’s case against ratification now very clearly revolves around the 
argument that ‘Kyoto’s implementation is supposed to cost a substantial amount of 
money in the US (as much as 3% GDP according to some estimates), while China will 
most likely profit by the agreement, since it has no emissions reductions obligations.  
Thus, the Kyoto agreement as it stood represented a potential ‘relative gains’ 
problem for the US’ (Vezirgiannidou, 2008:41).    
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11. COP 7: The Marrakech Accords  
The COP 7 meeting in Marrakech assumed greater significance in the wake of the US 
withdrawal.  As Hovi et al (2003:1) observe, despite the failure of the US to ratify 
Kyoto and the potentially massive loss of credibility for the UNFCCC during the 
period of the COP-6 negotiations, ‘the other Annex I nations carried on down the 
road that was pointed out in Kyoto’.  Significantly, one of these was Japan.  
Tiberghien and Schreurs (2007:70) have pointed out the significance of the fact that: 
‘after the George W. Bush administration pulled the United States out of the Kyoto 
Protocol in March 2001, Japan found itself the pivotal actor in the global battle over 
survival of the treaty’.  They suggest that, just as the US had pulled out of Kyoto, 
there was every possibility that Japan would follow, pressed particularly by the 
economic implications of the US impasse on ratification.  In particular, it was feared 
that Japanese businesses would suffer competitive disadvantage with developing 
nations such as China and India, as well as the US, who would now have no legal 
requirements to reduce emissions. 
 
The meeting in Marrakech wrapped up most of the technical details from the Buenos 
Aries Plan of Action, where the agreed package of decisions became known as the 
Marrakech Accords.  The US presence in Marrakech was now within the role of 
observer and the administration took no part in the formal negotiations around COP 
7.  Whilst it was hoped that the US would re-engage with the UNFCCC process at 
some point in the proceedings, in the meantime, signatories worked towards the 
requisite number of signatory ratifications – fifty-five – which were needed to 
activate the Kyoto Protocol into the activities of the UNFCCC.   
 
 
12. Embedded symbolism: Japan and post-2001 Kyoto politics 
The US withdrawal from Kyoto instigated a period of great uncertainty surrounding 
the future of the UNFCCC as a creditable political framework for reducing global 
carbon emissions.  However, whilst it was a big enough blow to lose the US, during 
this period there was a very real danger that there would be other casualties from the 
political fallout which followed.  Both Australia and Canada made noises to this 
effect. There was also a danger that Japan might withdraw in the wake of the US exit.  
As Tiberghien and Schreurs (2007) point out, ‘with the US out of Kyoto, the costs of 
ratification rose significantly and there was an awareness that Japan would now be 
expected to take painful and costly measures to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions 
without US industries having to take similar steps’. At this point, Japanese 
businesses became forceful in lobbying politicians to press for a US reversal or for a 
measure of state regulation through which to ensure that the responsibility of costs 
would not be passed on to them.  Tiberghien and Schreurs suggest that this period of 
time illustrates the ways in which, unlike the dominance of corporate interests in 
successfully blocking US ratification, the outcome of the Kyoto negotiations in Japan 
were ultimately a result of a greater reflection on the need to accommodate the 
internal relationship between state and market and a degree of consensus between a 
variety of domestic interests. Tiberghien and Schreurs have argued that, unlike the 
US, domestic politics in Japan was much more receptive to environmental concerns, 
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in turn influencing a more receptive stance on Kyoto than that adopted by the US 
Government.  
 
As in the US, Japanese political economy is characterized by the influence of its 
business interests, where a peak organization Keidanren wields a lot of power over 
policy (four-fifths of Japanese industry is represented by Keidanren).  There are also 
well developed links between Japanese industry and the powerful Liberal 
Democratic Party as well as established channels and structures of communication 
between business interests and the Japanese Ministry of Environment.  Tiberghien 
and Schreurs (2007) point out that, similar to views which were beginning to appear 
in the US, during the mid-1990s there was growing concern in Japanese industry 
regarding what its future role would be in addressing climate change. This was 
partly in anticipation of the impending Kyoto negotiations where it was hoped that, 
by adopting a ‘first mover’ approach, industry would be able to negotiate more 
favourable terms regarding regulation.  This was initially addressed through 1997’s 
Voluntary Action Plan for the Environment (VAPE), whereby the Keidanren galvanized 
its members around agreement to reduce emissions voluntarily in anticipation of the 
forthcoming Kyoto discussions.  Therefore, as they argue, membership of VAPE 
initially included ‘industries, representing 137 firms and organizations who agreed 
to develop plans to reduce their environmental footprint’ (Tiberghien and Schreurs, 
2007:72). 
 
From the point of view of Japanese industry, the ‘ratcheting up’ of commitments in 
the wake of Kyoto (Japan agreed to a 6 per cent reduction of their indigenous 
emissions) would not be a problem as long as the US stayed within the agreement 
and ratified their agreed emissions reduction target, which was set at 7 per cent 
according to 1990 baseline levels.  This then became the problem outlined above 
however, with the US withdrawal from Kyoto; an issue which was further 
complicated by no direct regulation on emissions from the competitor economies in 
the developing countries. 
 
Deciding to stay integrated into the UNFCCC process was further complicated by 
Japan’s somewhat ambiguous position regarding the objectives that they would now 
be committed to under the terms of the Kyoto Protocol.   Under their Annex I status, 
Japan had agreed to, what had turned out to be a fairly ambitious target in relation to 
their actual emission levels – which had grown at a rate of 7.5 per cent from 1990.  
This was compounded by the fact that Japan’s economic performance during the 
previous two decades was already characterized by the achievement of a high degree 
of energy efficiency.  This, coupled with voluntary commitments agreed upon prior 
to Kyoto, now ‘suggested to political and business leaders that making further cuts in 
emissions was not going to be easy’.  As Tiberghien and Schreurs note: ‘Armed with 
this knowledge, Japanese industry issued strong words of warning regarding the 
implications of Kyoto ratification in the absence of US ’ (2007:73).   
 
Yet, as Tiberghien and Schreurs reason, it is important to point out that Japanese 
industry was ultimately unable to exert the same kind of power over Kyoto 
ratification as corporate lobbies were able to do in the US.  Public opinion was also 
  
49
very much in favour of ratification, with opinion polls on climate change showing 
consistent public support of action on climate change.  Tiberghien and Schreurs have 
also suggested that Japan’s eventual decision to ratify was linked to shifting foreign 
policy objectives, where it was thought that public opinion could be harnessed with 
the national symbolism of Kyoto in order to provide a new corporate and political 
image for the nation.  Tiberghien and Schreurs suggest that these multiple lobbying 
positions made it more difficult to withdraw promises over ratification – as had 
happened in the US – and that some of whom were able to hold sway over the 
decision to ratify and others who became more influential over the implementation 
of Kyoto itself. 
 
Tiberghien and Schreurs conclude by arguing that there was never any real danger of 
Japan withdrawing from their Kyoto commitments due to the national symbolism 
which became attached to the Protocol itself.  They suggest that this ultimately 
became a political catalyst in encouraging the political convergence between the 
diversity of actors and issues – political convergence that was significantly absent in 
the US during the same period.    
 
13. COP 8 - COP 12: weighing up the economics of climate change 
mitigation 
With the US position unchanged on Kyoto ratification, UNFCCC signatories pressed 
ahead through subsequent COP discussions through the process of trying to engage 
the requisite number of countries to bring the Protocol into force.  It had been agreed 
that 55 countries needed to ratify in order to trigger activation – which would also 
need to incorporate signatories accounting for 55 per cent of developed country 
emissions.  As Hovi (2003:2) has observed, ‘when the US officially rejected the Kyoto 
Protocol, there were few remaining main players left.  While the US accounts for 36% 
of greenhouse gas emissions from Annex I countries, the EU accounts for 24%, Russia 
17% and Japan 8%, while Australia and Canada account for (roughly) 3% and 2% 
respectively’.  During this time therefore, it became important to keep the influence 
of these Annex I players on board and to hope that this might eventually sway the 
US to reconsider its position.    
 
That the Protocol itself took another eight years to come into force from the initial 
agreements made in 1997 was due to yet more political wrangling amongst the 
framework signatories – this time regarding clarification over both the baseline 
emission levels that Annex I countries would now be committed to under the terms 
of the treaty and also in regard to the timescales and time horizons which would 
embed signatory commitments into an active policy framework.  The baseline year 
by which progress could be measured in Annex I countries was tagged to the year 
1990 and was to be the measure by which progress or lack of progress in meeting 
emission reductions was to be assessed.  Therefore Annex I signatories provided 
inventories of their greenhouse gas emissions for the year 1990 and each country’s 
Kyoto target was then set to this level.  As Grubb et al (1999:71) point out: 
‘furthermore, this date had a huge significance as the year in which the world, by 
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first endorsing the first IPPC report, formally recognized climate change as a serious 
issue, and launched the negotiations that led to the Rio Convention’.  
 
However, consensus over baseline emission levels became a problem for several 
Annex I signatories, where it soon became apparent that there would be differential 
costs of implementing the treaty – linked to the diversity of carbon intensity in 
economic performance during this year.  The US had already argued this as a point 
of contention, arguing that high levels of growth in 1990 would mean more punitive 
environmental costs.  In Russia for instance, as Henry et al (2007:47) have argued: 
Industrial decline in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse 
meant that, since 1990 is the benchmark year for emissions limits under 
Kyoto, Russia has considerable room to increase emissions prior to 2012 before 
it will exceed its Kyoto emissions targets.  Russia also can sell its excess 
credits or attract investment designed to further reduce emissions (Henry et al 
(2007:47) 
 
Henry et al (2007:48) have argued that the decision to delay ratifying Kyoto until 
2004, when a potential for material gains and negligible costs became apparent, has 
been a puzzle to many observers.  Theoretically, the collapse of the Russian economy 
during 1990 meant that targets on greenhouse gas emissions would theoretically 
prove to be fairly easy.  They also point out that Kyoto now created a set of 
circumstances whereby ‘Russia could also sell its excess credits or attract investment 
designed to further reduce emissions’ (2007:48).  Henry et al suggest that failure to 
ratify until 2004 was partly due to the reluctance of the Russian Academy of Science 
to countenance ratification, but argue that opposition amongst Russian businesses, 
particularly within the energy industry, revolved around fears that the renaissance in 
Russia’s oil and gas reserves – sparked by global energy security issues – would be 
undermined under the Kyoto aims of curtailing polluting industries.   
 
Henry et al have argued that the delay in ratification revolved primarily around the 
longer-term economic and political benefits related to participation in Kyoto.  They 
suggest that concern for global environmental issues may well have been a minimal 
consideration in the final decision over ratification and that their position as a key 
signatory in Annex I in the wake of the US withdrawal from Kyoto became used as a 
bargaining chip in negotiating a place at the table of the World Trade Organization.  
Danilov-Danilian (2004) suggests that, ultimately, the economics of signing up to 
Kyoto (particularly the limited potential for selling carbon credits on an international 
market) ‘appeared small when weighed against revenue from other sources – in 
particular from the petroleum sector – which could be negotiated through the 
influence o of the World Trade Organization.  Russia finally ratified the Protocol in 
2004, which then enabled the activation of Article 25 and 55 per cent of Annex I 
emissions clause to take effect – 
 
Disputes over baseline emission levels and subsequent national targets characterized 
difficulties in both Canada’s and Australia’s ratification process.  Canada’s 
ratification of the Treaty in 2002 committed it to reduce emissions by 6 per cent 
below 1990 levels by 2012.  Echoing Vezirgiannidou’s (2008) theory on the 
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importance of identifying relative gains in the world economic system, the failure of 
the US to ratify the Treaty saw political leaders and industry become concerned that 
the competitiveness of Canadian businesses would be exposed in relation to US 
companies, who now remained free of climate change legislation.  This scenario was 
compounded by the fact that greenhouse gas emissions in Canada had increased by 
27 per cent during this period, compared with a 16 per cent rise in the US.   Realizing 
that Canada would almost certainly miss its Kyoto obligations, the Canadian 
Government argued that it would solve its climate change obligations through the 
voluntary structure of the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and 
Climate (APPCDC).   
 
13.1 Australia: the Kyoto Protocol and the climate policy challenge 
Rootes (2008:473) points out that ‘Australia, under the leadership of John Howard 
and his Liberal-National coalition government acquired notoriety as the only 
developed country other than the US to decline to ratify the Kyoto Protocol’.  Again, 
illustrating some of the points raised by  Vezirgiannidou’s ‘relative gains’ argument, 
during the period of this tenure, Howard had argued that the flourishing economies 
and growing population levels in countries such as China and India, constituted a 
threat to the competitive edge of Australia’s primary industrial base.  The fact that 
Australia was largely dependent upon indigenous coal for its electricity generation 
was thought to be a major factor behind the reluctance to come to agreement, but 
another factor was the current levels of inward investment in the fossil fuel intensive 
aluminum smelting industry. More importantly, as argued by the Centre for Energy 
and Environmental Markets, the Australian context for their stance on climate change 
policy and their part in the future of Kyoto was debated very much upon: 
 
Due to its large, low cost and high quality coal, gas and uranium reserves,  
Australia is a major energy exporter and has an energy intensive economy.  
Given its high domestic reliance on coal, Australia has amongst the world’s 
highest per-capita emissions.  Particularly significant is the fact that the last 
decade has seen considerable growth in GDP and energy consumption 
compared to many industrialized countries, and rapidly growing exports – 
Australia is now the world’s largest coal exporter and, second largest 
uranium exporter and major LNG exporter.  This is a challenging context for 
developing an effective climate change policy framework.  Energy related 
emissions (representing around 70 per cent of total emissions) rose by 
approximately 35 per cent between 1990 and 2004 and are projected to rise 50 
per cent above 1990 levels by 2010 (Centre for Energy and Environmental 
Markets, 2007:3) 
 
A major concern to ratifying Kyoto therefore was the future for Australia’s large 
agricultural export base. The particular concern voiced by the Howard Government 
was that Australia’s employment figures would be threatened by Kyoto signatories 
who had no commitments to emission reductions: 
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It is not in Australia’s interests to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  The reason it is 
not in Australia’s interests to ratify the Kyoto Protocol is that, because the 
arrangements currently exclude – and are likely under present settings to 
continue to exclude – both developing countries and the United States, for us 
to ratify the protocol would cost us jobs and damage our industry.  That is 
why the Australian Government will continue to oppose ratification (Prime 
Minister John Howard, 2002:3163). 
 
While Crowley (2007) has pointed out that Australia’s position on Kyoto during the 
period prior to 2008 has resembled the stance adopted by the United States – 
evidenced in some ways by its membership of the APPCDC and that fact that, along 
with the US, it was the only other developed nation to contend ratification.  Crowley 
has argued that in other ways its position has differed from the US. 
 
It has been argued that Australia has been something of a special case within the 
framework of the UNFCCC.  The negotiation of the so-called ‘Australia clause’ 
enabled any country ‘with net land clearing in 1990 to include the equivalent 
emissions in its baseline target’ (Crowley, 2007:120).  Australia had been the only 
Annex I nation to benefit from this clause which was identified in Article 3.7 of the 
protocol.  As Crowley argues, in many ways this clause translated into ‘easy credits 
yielded towards its Kyoto target from the net land clearing it was experiencing in 
1990 and the significant drop in clearing thereafter’ (Crowley, 2007:120).  Crowley 
makes the point that without this arrangement, Australia’s emissions in real terms 
would have been 25 per cent over 1990 levels instead of an agreement of 4 per cent 
due to the enactment of Article 3.7.  Crowley points out that the carbon intensity of 
Australia’s economic growth levels of the last 15 years has meant that its emission 
levels have actually increased considerably in real terms. 
 
Growing public support for stronger political regulation over climate change saw 
Australia sign up to the APPCDC in 2005 where, instead of simply dismissing the 
threat of global climate change out of hand, it was felt that looser, voluntary 
agreements over emission levels would offer greater flexibility to Australia’s 
economic concerns than the mandatory policy structure offered by the UNFCCC.  
Australia finally signed to Kyoto on the 24th November 2007 where Rootes suggests 
that much of the impetus for this came from an Australian public who were 
beginning to experience the observable effects of climate change through more 
observable weather changes such as droughts.  The Australian Government is still 
trying to construct an effective strategy through which to reconcile its new Kyoto 
commitments with its agricultural and industrial based export model.  Its Kyoto 
commitment has been labeled ‘the Australia clause’ because its uniquely high level of 
land clearance in 1990 has meant that it has an unusually high emission reduction 
target of 109 per cent 
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13.2 The search for alternatives: the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate 
Disagreements and a continuing disenchantment over the responsibilities that would 
be carried by the Annex I nations – and with the UNFCCC as the most effective 
political process through which to address global carbon emissions – led in part to 
the US and Australia agreeing to sign the Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development 
and Climate (APPCDC) in 2005.  The APPCDC was also signed by Canada, India, 
Japan, China and South Korea and participation was based around a more voluntary 
and individual commitment to reduce emissions in conjunction with agreement to 
both greater collaboration over technology transfer and more integrated negotiations 
between developed and developing countries over climate change.  As the APPCDC 
(2008:1) argues: ‘the partnership will focus on expanding investment and trade in 
cleaner technologies and goods and services in key sectors including: aluminum; 
buildings and appliances; cement; cleaner use of fossil fuel energy; coal mining; 
power generation and transmission; renewable energy and distributed generation; 
and steel’.  
 
Critics of APPCDC have argued that this collaboration is worthless due to the fact 
that emission reductions are currently unenforceable and are based upon voluntary 
agreements.  Advocates suggest that the agreement is a worthwhile venture due to 
the fact that, unlike Kyoto, it brings the US on board: clearly an essential aspect of 
any worthwhile agreement on reducing global emissions.  The structure of the 
APPCDC also provides an illustration that some countries believe that the greater 
emphasis that is placed on   economic growth may ultimately prove to be a more 
robust framework in delivering an effective climate change policy; chiefly through 
removing barriers to technology transfer and providing a system of market 
incentives that could enable developing countries to play a central role in rather than 
government imposed regulation.  Despite continued discussion over the role and 
content of the UNFCCC therefore, the introduction of APPCDC would suggest that 
original concerns over the design of the Kyoto Protocol regarding the uncertain 
status of climate change science have shifted over time – as the evidence has become 
more compelling – to the salience of political issues, notably a concern over a lack of 
stringent targets for developing countries in accord with Annex 1 countries. 
 
14. COP 13 to Copenhagen: climate change governance after Bali 
Haas (2008:1) has argued that the stakes of climate change governance became 
extremely high during what become known as the period characterized by 
discussions over the ‘Bali roadmap’ – the name given to the discussions which would 
take place through Bali, Poznan and Copenhagen to decide on the strategic 
framework which would succeed the Kyoto Protocol.   Carpenter (2008:3) has argued 
that ‘governments around the world – both developed and developing countries – 
agreed to step up their efforts to combat climate change’ during the meeting in Bali 
in 2007   As Haas has argued that, prior to Bali, a number of developments served to 
put the issue of climate change firmly at the forefront of the international agenda.  
Scientific opinion on both the effects and the origins of climate change become more 
consensual at the political during this period, informed particularly by the 2007 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group I report - which 
called anthropogenic climate change “unequivocal” – and also by the Stern Review 
on the economics of climate change, which argued that the costs of mitigation would 
amount to less than 2% of global GDP.  Both of these reports substantiated growing 
opinion that there would be severe consequences if global concentrations of carbon 
were allowed to exceed 450-550 ppm by 2050.  As Haas (2008:1) observes, there was a 
general viewpoint that ‘keeping emissions below this level would now entail 50-85 
percent reductions in carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 from current levels’.  
However, as Haas argued at the time: 
 
So far, few countries have achieved the limited aspirations laid out in Kyoto.  
Governments have not made major inroads into their emissions.  The OECD 
countries’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have increased since the baseline 
years 1990/1992 and are likely to continue to grow.  Strong economic growth 
means Chinese emissions are going through the roof, and China has already 
become the largest national GHG emitter earlier than projections anticipated. 
There is little evidence of policy change occurring as a consequence of the 
Kyoto Protocol or the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Haas, 
2008:3). 
 
The Bali Roadmap itself was characterized by the Bali Action Plan – ‘a new 
negotiating process to take place under a broader framework of governance than 
Kyoto.  The Bali Action Plan was to be a ‘two-track’ negotiating process – one which 
would discuss issues which were under the provision of the Kyoto agreements and a 
Convention track, which would try to integrate a range of issues and interests that 
remained outside of the legal framework of the Protocol.  There were many links 
between the two and the table below sets out the priority issues that were to be 
addressed under each track through the Bali Action Plan (Table 1).  
The Convention (UNFCCC) track 
• Focuses on four ‘building blocks’: adaptation, mitigation, technology transfer and 
deployment, financing 
• Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) also 
discussed 
• Mitigation actions from developing countries 
• Mitigation commitments from developing countries 
The Kyoto Protocol Track 
• Agree on developed country emission reduction targets by 2009.  At their third 
session in 2007, Parties to the Kyoto Protocol took note of the conclusions by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission reduction commitments between 25 and 40% below 1990 levels were needed 
on the part of industrialized countries for the period beyond 2012 to limit a mean 
global temperature increase, with GHG emissions peaking within the next 10 to 15 
years before going down 
• Means to achieve targets: market mechanisms, national policies,  
• Accounting issues, role of land use, land use change and forestry etc (Carpenter, 
2008:3). 
Table 1: Priority issues addressed through the Bali Action Plan 
  
55
The design of the Bali Action Plan itself revolved around four main issues through 
which it was felt that a two-track programme could encourage further progress in 
the lead up to Copenhagen – cutting emissions; mitigation; adaptation; technology; 
and financing.   
 
Carpenter (2008) argues that it was hoped that the Bali Action Plan would become a 
political response to increased urgency of climate change science, which now 
prompted the need for updated changes in both developed and developing countries 
in order to encourage deep cuts in global emissions which would be supported by: 
 
• Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation 
commitments or actions by all developed countries and; 
• Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties, 
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a 
measurable, reportable and verifiable manner (Carpenter, 2008:3). 
 
Giddens (2009) argues that the process of the Bali Roadmap since 2007 has yet to 
deliver on the above aims and he suggests that ‘the best one can say about Bali is that 
that negotiations did not collapse’.  He goes on to reason that the roadmap was 
‘really little more than a vague sketch with the agreements not containing a single 
specific commitment and offering no recognition of the problems inherent in the 
Kyoto framework’ (Giddens, 2009:192). 
 
Perhaps the biggest question to emerge from the Bali discussions revolved around 
the question of ‘who would now be responsible enough to move things forward?’ 
Ahead of Copenhagen, there were real hopes that the US might re-engage with the 
Kyoto Protocol in the wake of Barack Obama’s presidential inauguration in January 
2009.  With the Bush administration gone, it was hoped that the US might open up to 
a more multi-lateral stance on global climate issues and that signatories might no 
longer have to ‘work around’ the fact that the world’s largest polluter still remained 
outside of the Kyoto policy framework.  Observers such as Brzezinski (2009) argued 
that such a change might be critical in encouraging China change its political stance 
within the UNFCCC. 
 
During the period leading up to Copenhagen, the European Commission announced 
plans for a comprehensive package of measures regarding energy and climate 
change.  Claimed to be a set of proposals which would lead global action on climate 
change, the main aims of what Commission president Jose Manuel Barroso has called 
the ‘20/20/20 proposals’ were that Europe would cut greenhouse gas emissions by 
20%, produce 20% of its energy from renewable sources and increase energy 
efficiency by 20%.  Added to this, the Commission has proposed that 10% of 
transport fuels must be sourced from bio-fuels by 2020.  Barroso himself argued that 
the measures constitute ‘the most far-reaching legislative proposals made by the 
European Commission for many years’ (Barroso, 2008:1).   
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15. Conclusions: what we have learned from COP 15, Cancun, and the way 
forward 
The disappointment of COP 15 to produce a substantive global climate change 
strategy illustrate the many weaknesses in the UNFCCC process as a political 
framework which will galvanize a collective effort to design a low carbon future 
which is able to synthesize the complexities of global politics and the increasing 
urgency of climate change science.  This paper suggests that outcomes to the 
Copenhagen Climate Change Summit were not entirely unexpected – particularly 
given the political process which has characterized the historical evolution of the 
UNFCCC.   
 
The most recent climate change summit in Cancun, Mexico suggests that the 
UNFCCC process is no nearer to finding the answers to some of the issues raised in 
this paper.  Whilst the discussions in Cancun: affirmed that ‘climate change is one of 
the greatest challenges of our time and that all Parties share a vision for long-term 
cooperative action in order to achieve the objective of the Convention under its 
Article 2, including through achievement of a global goal, on the basis of equity and 
in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities (Ad Hoc Working 
Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, 2010), this remains 
little more than an agreement, with little evidence to suggest that Parties are any 
closer to a substantive policy framework through which to follow this up.   With 
continued dispute over responsibilities for ‘deep emission cuts’ still unclear, there is 
as yet no follow on to the Kyoto Protocol, suggesting that consideration that global 
temperature rise be limited to 2o – 1.5o above pre-industrial levels, remains an 
abstract aspiration in relation to current political reality.  Likewise, it has yet to be 
agreed how a proposed of a £100 billion a year ‘Green Climate Fund’ to assist 
developing countries financially to reduce their emissions and to adapt to already 
existing climate change, will operate and who will provide the funding.  Doyle (2010) 
suggests that the agreements at COP 16 ‘have fallen woefully short of action needed’.  
 
Whilst advocates of the UNFCCC process suggest that as the science moves closer to 
a degree of global consensus regarding the consequences of a changing climate, the 
effectiveness of the policies that have been put in motion by the UNFCCC framework 
will oversee a process of convergence concerning signatories’ own indigenous policies 
and the need to change or adapt from a ‘business-as-usual’ approach in alignment 
with emerging intra-state responsibilities regarding the ‘global commons’.  On a 
wider scale, it was hoped that ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ would be 
able to provide a bridge across global divisions in power and wealth as a barrier to 
global sustainability.  
 
As this paper has argued, there is a reasonable argument to suggest that the political 
tensions around the need to action on climate change came to a head at COP 15 – the 
discussions themselves itself serving to ‘ossify’ the sharp economic, political and 
historical fissures between developed and developing countries and to exacerbate 
rather than close the tensions which have long been apparent between environment 
and development aims. The discussions themselves served to strengthen the long-
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held emphasis on national self-interest, continuing to subsume wider, collective 
values – values which it would be reasonable to suggest, would invariably be an 
integral part of global efforts to address climate change. 
 
The more recent position of China and India as major global economic players for 
instance, has become particularly illustrative of the primacy of the interface between 
political and economic issues at the global level, which have informed a tension 
between environmental and developmental goals.  While these countries currently 
pursue the same blueprint of economic growth as western nations followed during 
the post-war period of embedded liberalism – i.e. carbon intensive industrialization 
alongside weak environmental regulation, alongside an ethical justification for doing 
so – both nations will shortly overtake the US as the world’s leading energy 
consumer. Thus, so far it has been difficult to engage, in particular, both the US and 
China in an effective UNFCCC agreement as both have been unable or unwilling to 
reconcile their own domestic politics – and a primary emphasis on continuing to 
ensure economic growth – with IPCC recommendations. As Boehmer-Christiansen 
has argued, the UNFCCC process has often been concerned with accommodating 
political claims and justifications regarding continued access to fossil fuel sources 
and growth indexed levels of pollution, rather than with global environmental 
concerns per se.     
 
Consequently, as the paper has argued, it is perhaps an insubstantive ability to 
address the role of global inequality in the organizational structure of the UNFCCC 
which might best explain the principal structuring effects by which UNFCCC 
signatories relate to each other in the global political economy. Within this argument, 
it was suggested that Wallerstein’s (1979) idea of the ‘world systems’ approach to 
international relations can provide us with important insights as to why the 
UNFCCC has yet to deliver an effective global climate change agreement.  The paper 
suggests that national governments are largely incapable or unwilling to engage in 
the levels of cooperation which are necessary to reach effective global agreement on 
climate change as there is a fear that this may ultimately compromise their position 
in the global economic order. As the negotiations throughout the history of the 
UNFCCC have demonstrated, non-climate issues of trade and aid are invariably 
implicated in discussions. However, the climate issue does not stand in isolation 
from these and from the historical legacy of unequal global economic relations.  This 
also links into a structural tension around how to reconcile historical responsibility 
with future responsibility which remains unresolved by the UNFCCC aim of 
encouraging ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’. Developing nations argue 
that developed nations have developed (and continue to develop) at the expense of 
the environment, whilst developed nations point out that climate change itself was 
unproven for much of this period.  
 
Timmons Roberts and Parks (2007:41) suggest that there is often a fear amongst 
developing nations that climate negotiations give the more powerful a chance to 
wield power over poor and dependent countries and to ‘kick the development 
ladder’.  In Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, Krasner 
(1985) has argued that the conflict which has emerged around this unequal core-
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periphery relationship, has perpetuated particular ‘worldviews’.  Timmons Roberts 
and Parks suggest that these worldviews have emerged in the UNFCCC, where 
developing countries have often been wary of developed country motives in what 
they call a ‘climate of mistrust’, often leading to ‘defensive negotiating strategies by 
poorer nations and reduced likelihood of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement’.  
They argue that this can be observed in COP meetings where developing nations 
often lack the scientific expertise and organizational capacity of developed nations in 
discussions. Furthermore, as the paper argued, the formation of the G77 was 
originally a response from the developed world to the formation of a new global 
economic order in the wake of the advent of the cold war.  There were signs at 
Copenhagen and in Cancun that the G77 itself has split off according to some 
countries identifying themselves within the semi-periphery of Wallerstein’s model.  
It could be argued for instance that the countries comprising BASIC have formed 
around a continuing reliance on fossil fuel burning economies (as with OPEC), as 
opposed to AOSIS and the developing countries who have had to form around 
vulnerability to the more urgent effects of climate change.  There is a good argument 
to suggest that these shifting political alliances in relation to national self-interest, 
economic gain, and political sovereignty, were beginning to emerge through each 
COP meeting as the urgency of climate change science began to pose a threat to the 
status quo around the existing world economic order.   
 
Despite the poor outcome of Copenhagen and Cancun as the latest period of the 
UNFCCC process, Andonova et al (2009:52) suggest that environmental issues are 
now such a complex issue for governance that ‘governing mechanisms have now 
taken on a variety of forms beyond a reliance of effective multilateral agreements.  
Moreover, authority is diffuse across levels of social order and types of actors’.  
Chukwumerije et al (2009:58) suggest the increasing profile and growing influence of 
non-state actors, regions and locales, are beginning to pose important challenges for 
how we conceptualize the nature of global governance and what its role might be: 
particularly in relation to the growing threat of climate change.  Perhaps what the 
most recent period of the UNFCCC negotiations have demonstrated is that national 
governments are not capable of coming together in order to solve the global climate 
problem.  Therefore, it could be argued that if the supranational framework will not 
deliver, perhaps the impetus for environmental change might emerge from the sub-
national or local level.  A challenge might be in how to motivate and encourage more 
people-based movements and solutions to encourage governance around the climate 
issue to emerge from below rather than from above.  
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